Despite heavy sanctions, international condemnation and pandemic shortages, North Korea has plowed ahead with its nuclear weapons program in recent years. The U.S. and South Korea have warned that the DPRK is ready to conduct its seventh nuclear test at any time, and Seoul’s latest defense white paper estimates North Korea’s enriched plutonium stockpile now stands at 70 kg.

But while Pyongyang’s stockpiles of fissile material have grown, a look back at the history of the country’s nuclear program shows that it has a poor track record of managing the waste created by its Yongbyon nuclear laboratory and Punggyre-ri test site.

Even so, nuclear waste management is one of the few problems that North Korea has engaged the international community to solve in the past. This has included both states and individual actors, particularly when cash is involved.

Managing the byproducts of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program thus represents a possible vector for re-engaging Pyongyang diplomatically if and when the opportunity arises, one that would provide valuable insights into the size and scope of the DPRK’s nuclear activities while also mitigating risk for the regime.

TESTING DANGERS

Little is known about the past and present impacts of North Korean nuclear testing, but decades of testing in other countries in the last century indicate that a range of environmental impacts are possible, notably the release of radioactive pollution into the atmosphere and water systems, despite limited information about the effects of the DPRK’s testing in particular.

Radioactive seepage can occur when radioactive gasses and particulate matter diffuse through the earth and into the surrounding area. Nearby air and groundwater in Punggye-ri may be contaminated as a result. 

North Korea has not allowed any independent observers to access the site and monitor it, so the quantity of nuclear waste emitted after each of North Korea’s underground nuclear tests is difficult to estimate as a result.

But one Seoul-based nongovernmental organization estimated earlier this year that up to half a million North Korean and Chinese citizens are at risk of radiation exposure from underground nuclear detonations in Punggye-ri.

The risk is apparently high enough that South Korea will begin testing defectors from the northeast region of the DPRK for radiation exposure and illness.

North Korean nuclear testing can also have effects far beyond the peninsula. For instance, xenon gas was detected as far away as Canada after the DPRK’s first nuclear test in Oct. 2006, allowing scientists to identify more information about the tested nuclear weapon.

‘ATROCIOUS’ PRACTICES

Unlike with North Korea’s nuclear testing, problems with its handling of nuclear waste at its primary nuclear research facility in Yongbyon are more firmly established.

David Albright of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security said in 2021 that the way North Korean authorities handle nuclear waste at the Yongbyon nuclear site is “atrocious” and extremely dangerous, referring to “old fashioned unsafe ways of burying waste.”

The result, he said, is that Yongbyon is highly contaminated. The Yongbyon nuclear site is located in an inhabited area, creating real risks for the nearby population.

In 2016, 38 North reported North Korea had discarded waste from a uranium mine into a pond in North Hwanghae Province without any obvious lining or other safety measures that would prevent it from seeping into the groundwater. 

The production of fissile material, a key component of nuclear weapons, also poses significant health risks to the North Korean people and is harmful to the environment.

Observation of the nuclear storage capacities of North Korea is critical as any activities on these facilities can provide indicators about the level of activity in North Korea’s nuclear program. There is also a nuclear storage facility in Geumchang, North Pyongan Province.

In 2005, a U.S. Department of Energy report estimated that radioactive waste emitted at Yongbyon could be around 800 square meters, including 500 square meters of high-level waste and 300 square meters of intermediate-level waste. Given our limited visibility into the DPRK’s nuclear program, these estimates likely don’t represent the full picture of nuclear waste.

It’s also important to note that there have been no inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities for years. Given that the DPRK has now conducted six nuclear tests, the amount of nuclear waste has likely increased significantly over the two decades since the Department of Energy released those estimates.

A PATH TO COOPERATION?

Pyongyang appears aware of the problems that nuclear waste can cause and has sought to mitigate these risks both legally and illicitly. Under the Agreed Framework, for instance, U.S. authorities financed the management of North Korean nuclear wastes through the company NAC International.

North Korea has also responded positively in the past to the prospect of managing nuclear waste from other countries as a way to raise hard cash. In 1997, Pyongyang signed a deal with Taipei to dispose of Taiwanese nuclear waste from atomic power plants at a cost of tens of millions of dollars. The scheme would have seen Taiwanese reactor waste transported to the Korean Peninsula and deposited into unused North Koren mines. 

But public outcry from Seoul — which worried about possible cross-border contamination — and the Taiwanese public ultimately led Taipei to scrap the deal.

North Korea also sought to rid itself of nuclear waste through illicit means. Newly declassified intelligence files suggest the notorious arms dealer Giorgio Comerio dumped 200,000 barrels of North Korean nuclear waste in waters near Taiwan in exchange for nearly $230 million. It’s unclear if any money ever changed hands.

LONG ROAD AHEAD

North Korea could again seek to sell nuclear waste storage on land or within its maritime boundaries — legally or illicitly. 

Other countries have attempted such schemes before. Under Deng Xiaoping, China signed a letter of intent with three West German firms to facilitate the transfer of nuclear waste from Europe to storage facilities in the Gobi Desert. 

However, it’s difficult to imagine any credible actor today would be willing to entertain such a deal with North Korea, which has a long history of reneging on business contracts. Nor would surrounding states like China, Russia and South Korea likely sanction such a storage plan so close to their borders.

Still, nuclear waste management may be one issue that Kim Jong Un would be willing to engage on. The U.S., China, and other actors interested in coaxing the North Korean leader back to the negotiating table may want to include nuclear waste in their conversations.

Edited by Arius Derr