The era of Kim Jong Un began just two years ago, and so far not many changes have been observed in North Korea. However, a few things changed clearly and dramatically, and one of these is the situation on the 1,200-kilomter-long border between North Korea and China. It seems that the authorities have managed to significantly decrease cross-border human traffic, while their efforts to curb the flow of information and money have so far been less successful.

A very porous – essentially open – border with China has remained a peculiar feature of the North Korean situation. From the late 1990s and until approximately 2008 or 2009 border–crossing was relatively easy and safe. The soldiers could occasionally shoot a fugitive, and sometimes an attempted crossing could end in drowning, but in most cases the border –crossers – defectors, smugglers and illegal labor migrants – easily reached their destination in China. Sometimes it would be advisable to bribe guards, but usually smugglers needing to move bulky and expensive merchandise did this.

BORDER REVERSAL

Most North Korea observers have taken for granted that the border would remain porous forever. It was assumed that the North Korean government was incapable of putting it under control. Admittedly, some people argued that this remarkable porousness of the border might be tolerated by authorities who might have seen it as a safety valve: A near-open border ensured that the most troublesome and desperate would always have a chance to leave the country instead of fomenting dissent at home. But this was a minority view: Most observers believed that the North Korean government was not capable of sealing the country’s northern border tight enough.

However, from around 2010 things began to change. The number of soldiers on the North Korean side of the border increased dramatically. The soldiers were now frequently rotated, so it became more difficult for he locals to get known the guards and bribe them. The discipline in the military was enforced, and number of posts increased significantly. It became almost impossible to cross the border rivers unnoticed.

There were changes on the Chinese side, too. From 2011 the Chinese began to build a large barbed wire fence on the Chinese side of the border which hitherto had almost no physical obstacles whatsoever. By late 2012 the “long fence,” some three meters high, ran along the entire length of the border. Admittedly, the Chinese contractors made a shady work: The tension of wires was not high enough, so people could easily get through. However, the CCTV cameras and much larger number of soldiers mean that now border-crossers face much higher chances of being apprehended. Nonetheless, most locals agree that China continues to take a rather relaxed approach, and the North Korean side creates the major obstacles.

There are good reasons to believe that these measures have been quite effective. A dramatic hike in the exit costs for aspiring cross-border refugees has confirmed this. As recently as 2008, most refugees did not bother to bribe guards, but rather waited for a good night and took their chances crossing the frozen border river (some chose to swim across it in summer, a much riskier option). Those who preferred to pay seldom spent more than a hundred dollars per person. The only exceptions were smugglers, but even those usually paid bribes to the tune of $300-500.

DISCOURAGING DEFECTORS

Now the price of border-crossing has increased to some $4-5,000, an exorbitant sum for the average North Korean. This money is paid to the guards who have to share the booty with their superiors high in the food chain.

So, it is not surprising that the numbers of refugees has decreased dramatically. While no exact data can possibly exist, it seems that now less than 10,000 North Koreans are hiding in China at any given moment. To put things into perspective, in the late 1990s the number was as high as 200,000.

Even more vivid confirmation of the new policy’s efficacy is the decline in the number of refugees who arrive to the South. Until 2011, their numbers grew steadily, but in 2012 there was a dramatic decline in the number of new arrivals, from 2,706 to 1,509. Judging by the preliminary results (1,041 arrivals towards the end of September), this year will be marked by further decline, albeit a relatively small-scale one.

Therefore, it appears that the North Korean government has made a political decision to close down the border – and to the surprise of many North Korean watchers (including myself), it found sufficient resources to do so. Since the policy change became noticeable in 2010, the year Kim Jong Un began his ascent to power, the dramatic change in attitude toward defections is frequently attributed to the young Supreme Leader. While this assertion cannot be verified, it looks plausible indeed. It is also worth remembering that after Kim Jong Un’s ascent to power, the official media launched a number of campaigns aimed at discouraging defection. This is a new feature, since until recently the issue itself could not be mentioned in North Korean media.

MONEY & INFORMATION INCREASING

At the same time, the efforts of the North Korean authorities have so far had little impact on the movement of information and, increasingly, money. The professional brokers are rich enough to pay large bribes, so letters and Chinese mobile phones are still moved across the border with relative ease and impunity.

It seems that there has been a rapid increase in the amount of money sent to North Korea by refugees from the South. The money transfers are normally arranged through a hwagyo businessman (or, frequently, businesswoman). Hwagyo are ethnic Chinese, citizens of China with permanent residence rights in North Korea. They constitute the only group of foreigners who can reside in North Korea legally. Hwagyo tend to be very rich, since they make most of their unique status, using their relative security (North Korean police deal with hwagyo in special cases only) and ease of the overseas travel.

To arrange a money transfer, a refugee in North Korea (usually assisted by a broker) deposits an agreed sum of money at the Chinese bank account of a hwagyo or his representative. Money does not cross the North Korean border and remains in China where hwagyo visit regularly. Once the money is received, the hwagyo middleman (or middlewoman) arranges for his or her agent inside North Korea to deliver the money, minus commission, to the designated receiver who often lives in a different city.

The standard commission now is 30 percent, so if the refugees in North Korea deposit $1,000 into a Chinese bank, his or her relative in North Korea receives $700. The system is quite reliable – I know dozens of people who systematically send money to the North, and never hear of them being cheated. The transfer usually takes few days or few weeks, but in one exceptional case (last month, as a matter of fact), the entire operation took 40 minutes.

The “Southern money” has seemingly become a major factor in North Korean life. According to a joke, “if a political police inspector has in his area just one family of refugees to the South, he should not worry about his income” (since the defector’s families are doing well due to the remittances, and also willing to pay generous bribes to avoid trouble). It has been estimated that the total value of the refugees’ monetary transfers has reached $12-15 million annually. By North Korean standards this is not a negligible amount of money.

“Southern money” is exercising an adverse influence on the regime, since the transfers vividly demonstrate the material prosperity of the South. So far, however, the government has not done much to stop the remittances. It is possible to argue that it is simply impossible but, taking into account the recent successful crackdown on the border, it would be better not to jump to conclusions. It is still possible that the North Korean authorities do not actually mind such activities that, at the end of the day, bring the hard currency they need so badly.

Photo: Main photo by Eric Lafforgue

The era of Kim Jong Un began just two years ago, and so far not many changes have been observed in North Korea. However, a few things changed clearly and dramatically, and one of these is the situation on the 1,200-kilomter-long border between North Korea and China. It seems that the authorities have managed to