The pictures below also evoke images from propaganda past (see Myers, p. 123). They essentially state – here is Kim Jong Un, arm and arm with various people, advancing the revolution as his father and grandfather did before him.

While Kim Jong Il may have been featured in this exact pose in propaganda posters, it differs greatly from how he actually performed inspections. Especially near the end of his life he was quite aloof, and he certainly never got this close to others on his inspection tours. This may be the regime’s attempt to show a more personal, and dare I say, warm face of the regime that was lacking during Kim Jong Il’s time.

Elite Data 

For this section I will omit the appearances that revolved around Kim Jong Il (i.e. his funeral or tribute to him.) That brings the total number of appearances to fifteen, of these the people who have appeared with Kim Jong Un more than once are the following:

Jang Song Thaek, unsurprisingly, leads the pack, although his wife, Kim Jong Un’s aunt, is conspicuous by her absence.[iii] Also at the top of the list is Gen. Kim Myong Guk, who was a close ally of Kim Jong Il and Director of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff Department. The bureau is responsible for all operational aspects of the KPA and previously reported directly to Kim Jong Il. Gen. Kim Won Hong, the Director of the Military Security Command, frequently accompanied Kim Jong Il at military events after the September 2010 conference. It is important to note that the Military Security Command is “tasked with monitoring the activities and political loyalties of DPRK military commanders and other KPA officers” and previously also reported directly to Kim Jong Il (notice a theme?).[iv] Gen. Pak Jae Gyong is a Vice Minister within the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces, and may have been close with Kim if his history of advancement is any indication. His first known position was in 1980 as Director of the Propaganda Department in the General Political Department (the year Kim Jong Il was formally introduced): he received promotions in 1993, 1994 and 1997, and in 2100 he visited Seoul as a surrogate for Kim and the NDC. Vice Marshal Kim Yong Chun and Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho are self-evidently important, as has been discussed elsewhere. Pak To Chun holds a number of key positions – member of the NDC, member of the Secretariat, alternate member of the Politburo, and Secretary of Military Industry. Perhaps the most interesting going forward is the appearance of Lt. Gen. Ri Tu Song. Ri had previously appeared twice with Kim Jong Il, both times in October of last year. What makes him interesting is that he was promoted to lieutenant general, and mentioned by name, on the same day that Kim Jong Un became a general. That fact, combined with his recent appearances, may be an indication that Ri will play a more important role going forward.

The obvious similarity to Kim Jong Il’s succession is that there has been a clear decision to surround Kim Jong Un with major figures in the regime to signal continuity and acceptance. Where Kim Jong Il was seen with and endorsed by first generation revolutionaries like O Jin U (Minister of People’s Armed Forces) and Choe Gwang (Chief of the KPA General Staff), Kim Yong Chun and Ri Yong Ho have been featured prominently in this succession. The major difference is that Kim Jong Il was seemingly able to bring some of his own men up with him, with Kim Myong Guk and Kim Yong Chun getting promotions at the time, while it may be some period before Kim Jong Un has the same ability.

Going Forward

None of this really sheds a great deal of light on what Kim Jong Un’s or the current regime’s (if they ever felt the need to replace him) chances of survival are. More important is likely to be events outside of the regime’s control – many of which seem to be heading in a more favorable direction. China recently shipped a large amount of aid, apparently to show its support for the new regime.[v] Elections in South Korea will, at the very least, send someone to the Blue House who is more open to engagement, and if the DUP candidate wins you could see a return to the “Sunshine” policy of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun. An Obama win in November would also increase the chances of US engagement with the regime as well, especially if that win was accompanied by Democratic gains in the House and Senate. The huge caveat is that, outside of Chinese aid, all of this assumes that the North Koreans don’t engage in provocations which could submarine engagement before it starts. The U.S. and ROK, while remaining appropriately skeptical, will likely take tentative steps towards engagement with the KJU regime when they are ready to negotiate – whether or not North Korea reciprocates will largely determine how 2012 on the Korean peninsula turns out.
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