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Many strategies have been suggested to deal with North Korea. Some involve sanctions or even a military strike. Some think we should support a coup in Pyongyang — or maybe that outside forces should launch a decapitation strike.

There are those who argue that engaging with the North would either open up the country or make the regime less stable and collapse.

One solution to the North Korea problem that is not discussed as often is that of surrendering North Korea to China. In other words, the interested parties agree to a joint strategy of using all possible diplomatic and economic means to force the DPRK to sign an agreement that effectively strips it of most of its sovereignty and makes it a client state of Beijing.

This strategy could solve both of the United States’s primary concerns: North Korea’s strategic weaponry and their appalling human rights record. The DPRK’s arsenal would come under Beijing’s control and thus pose no more or less threat to Washington than the weaponry the PRC already has.

As for human rights, even at its worst, Xi Jinping’s China is far less malevolent than Kim Jong Un’s North Korea. Even though it’s censored, Chinese people have access to the internet; North Koreans do not. Chinese people can legally leave their country, North Koreans cannot. And so on.

For Beijing, the North’s subjugation would bring direct land access to South Korea, potentially boosting Chinese trade with Seoul. It would also mean free access to the Sea of Japan — useful for trade, as the Northeast of China has a very large population and economy.

Of course, the very fact that Pyongyang would be reduced to a compliant puppet state is a plus for Beijing as well.

A North Korean army under Chinese control would also majorly benefit South Korea’s security, as it is far less likely that such an army would indulge in any provocations. Perhaps Seoul could even afford to abolish conscription.

Like with China, South Korea would gain from the trade and travel bonuses that would come along with a penetrable border. The country would cease to be a de-facto island.

Some may argue that a China-controlled DPRK would mean the death of the unification dream, but this author begs to differ. The Kimist North Korea has proven itself to be remarkably stable; there is absolutely no evidence to suggest the regime that survived the mass famine of the 1990s more prone to collapse than a Beijing puppet state. Unification could still happen at some point in the future.

Moscow would very much prefer dealing with partners in Beijing than the reckless and widely disliked Kim dynasty regime. They want trade with North and South Korea and they want North Korean workers back in the country’s Far East. All this could be arranged.

Japan would feel less threatened by a Beijing puppet master, and the issue of Japanese abductees in the North could be settled easily.

The North Korean elite themselves would much rather take orders from the Chinese than be absorbed by South Korea. The regime’s worst offenders may share the fate of Bo Xilai, but most would probably stick around. Seoul is highly unlikely to offer up anything nearly that favorable.

And for the rest of the world, one of the most horrible places starting to become less so would mean one less headache.

The problem with the China remedy is that it wouldn’t be an easy sell.

Relations between Washington and Beijing are frosty, and such a solution to the North Korea problem would appear to many observers as “empowering China.” Given that, objectively speaking, Xi Jinping is tilting China toward authoritarianism and is not popular with either of the major parties in the U.S., this factor would become more important as time went on.

In South Korea, where the dream of one Korea is still very much alive, such a suggestion would be perceived as anti-unification.

China may have concerns about the costs of rebuilding the North Korean economy. While unlikely, Russia may worry about no longer being perceived as an influential power in Korea.

In Japan, end of the threat from North Korea riddance would probably be met positively in the short-term, but the prospect of heavy Chinese presence in Chongjin and Wonsan would make Tokyo uneasy.

And Kim Jong Un, of course, would do his very best to prevent this scenario from happening. He absolutely does not want to lose power over his country.

Nevertheless, the proposed strategy is much less vague and more realistic than the rest.

Invading the North would result in millions of deaths. A coup may fail. Economic pressure has not borne much fruit, and engagement would likely lessen the Iron Curtain around the country but has no guarantee of resulting in reforms or a revolution.

In this plan of action, the means, the strategy, and the results are quite clear. The China solution is certainly something worth thinking about.

Edited by Oliver Hotham