Mention North Korean propaganda in casual conversation (as you do) and one name is likely to come up: Ri Chun Hee, the hanbok-wearing, effervescent bearer of news, good and bad, on the DPRK’s screens for over four decades.

The continued presence of Ms. Ri on North Korean TVs is a testament to how little has changed in North Korea’s state media — at least on the surface — in that time.

And while she has slowly been replaced by a cast of younger, more temperate presenters, the style of the country’s state television has remained the same, at least for the most part.

But beyond the staid studios of Korean Central Television, Pyongyang may be experimenting with new styles — and working to reach out to an international audience.

Enter Un A and her colleagues, hosts of a new online series devoted to showing off “real life” in the DPRK and, crucially, fighting supposed “fake news” about the country.

And although the style is a little rough around the edges, “What’s up Pyongyang?” and its affiliated content could represent the most forward-looking North Korean media initiative in years. If successful, it could even serve as Pyongyang’s answer to the kinds of glossy propaganda seen in Russia’s RT and China’s CGTN and, potentially, a major soft power boost for the closed-off country.

A COLD NOODLE FAN

Un A’s content may be just a few months old, but she appears to have links to a well-documented network of DPRK state media-connected websites and social media accounts.

Most prominent among these — at least for English-speaking audiences — is the Twitter account “@coldnoodlefan,” which began posting all the way back in summer 2017.

Who is behind the account isn’t clear. The user first purported to be a “poor” person in Japan, but has claimed to be a Russian named Yulia since July 2018, insisting ever since that their exclusive content shot in Pyongyang is given to them by friends who travel in and out of the DPRK.

According to an NK News investigation last year, however, the account is linked to the North Korean state-run “Sogwang” (Dawn) Media, and displays a pattern of coordinated posting across the Twitter page, the outlet’s website, and Chinese social media.

Sogwang is a North Korean corporation based in Pyongyang with ties to Singapore, running a restaurant, a tech company, and likely other enterprises in addition to its media output. It also shares media with other state-run outlets and organizations such as the Foreign Languages Publishing House.

The company has since 2017 often provided valuable content on DPRK businesses and culture in a slightly less propagandistic style than other state outlets, and since 2018 began publishing more English-subtitled videos produced by its employees on the ground in Pyongyang.

Since last year’s NK News investigation, a second Chinese Weibo account linked to Sogwang has grown in popularity, recently teaming up with @coldnoodlefan to coordinate the promotion of the “cute young lady” named Un A and her “Pyongyang Tour Series.”

UN A MAKES HER FIRST APPEARANCE

Un A’s first video was posted to the YouTube account “Echo” — previously proven to be an account run by @coldnoodlefan or another Sogwang employee — on November 9, and to the @coldnoodlefan Twitter page a day later.

Her name was included in the YouTube video title, while @coldnoodlefan upped the intrigue by stating it was an “#Exclusive video!!” and a “rare chance to look deep into the life of Pyongyang citizens.”

She was also described as a “#Cute young lady,” following a pattern exhibited by all of the Sogwang-linked social media accounts: sex sells, after all, even more so for a North Korean-linked account looking to generate interest online.

Two more Un A “Pyongyang Tour Series” videos were released through early January on the YouTube page and later the Twitter page, but saw Un A speaking Korean and acting as a virtual tour guide, with prospective North Korea fans having to resort to reading English subtitles on screen.

This changed on January 10, however, with the reintroduction of Un A as a North Korean state media outlet’s first modern, relatable, English-speaking on-camera host.

16 Un A videos in total — 13 in English — have been published as of this article’s publication, with @coldnoodlefan continuing to label the host a “beautiful” or “cute young lady,” using various hashtags for full outreach effect.

The videos are a mix of traditional cultural promotion, efforts to debunk “western” media claims about North Korea, and boasts of domestic successes.

Un A can be seen reading lines in front of a green screen in a set up similar to a news anchor, while @coldnoodlefan calls her content “coverage” and asks, for example, if readers “Want to know real stories on coronavirus inside the DPRK???”

Others begin with Un A running in slow motion or with the camera zoomed in on her face for different poses, seemingly focused on personalizing the host as a friend of the viewer.

“Perhaps you could help me choose the best one,” she says to the camera as she tries on traditional outfits in a video titled “I’m a Korean Girl.” “Beautiful, isn’t it? What do you think?” she asks.

On the Weibo side of the operation, an account long linked to Sogwang, whose name roughly translates to “I will take you to Koryo,” began in mid-April to simultaneously post the Un A videos with Chinese subtitles over the same spoken English content.

The account has even taken on her persona as their new avatar and often takes credit in the comment sections for compliments intended for Un A, though has not claimed to be Un A herself. 

Besides the Un A videos, another Weibo account — which recently rebranded itself from the name “DPRK Today” in Chinese (not related to dprktoday.com) to “New DPRK” in English — continues to post more propaganda-style videos of middle-class life in Pyongyang with a Korean-speaking local host.

The Echo YouTube page and @coldnoodlefan Twitter, too, also continue to promote other videos featuring another “pretty young lady” host speaking Korean with English subtitles.

READERS REACT

A few of Un A’s videos posted to YouTube have drawn more attention than others, but by far the largest number of her fans are viewing the English-language content through the Chinese social media platform Weibo.

Comments on both platforms appear mostly positive, expressing thanks for providing “rare” content, or support for the DPRK government or system promoted in the videos. 

Some appear to be fans, asking about Un A’s personal life and health.

Arguments have even broken out in some comment threads on the more widely-shared videos, with commenters criticizing the content as propaganda and others defending it.

The account managers on Twitter, YouTube, and Weibo all interact with commenters to some extent. @coldnoodlefan often engages in debates (even with NK News reporters) and Echo occasionally expresses a simple thanks or even answers questions regarding the provenance of the content. 

“I will take you to Koryo” on Weibo engages the most by far, responding to almost every commenter on some videos with thanks, emojis, and acknowledgment of detailed questions but not much in terms of revelations.

ELITE CONNECTIONS?

Little information is publicly available about our enigmatic presenter. Un A (surname unknown) appears to be in her mid-to-late twenties, speaks fluent English, and is plugged in to foreign media and what it says about her country.

She and her colleagues also appear to have internet access, placing them in the very-top-tier of the North Korean elite, as well as money to pay for decent video equipment. 

She may have elite family connections, a source told NK News — likely a father working as a top official in the country’s ruling party — a link also proposed by several North Korea watchers.

“The young woman strikes me as the pampered child of a rich official who is having fun with her new camera and software,” Meredith Shaw, a researcher on North Korean culture at the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Social Science, says, suggesting the programs may be a personal initiative on Un A’s part and not directed from the top. 

“She’s probably someone who studied abroad and is familiar with Western social media styles.”

Another expert points to the clear foreign influence in the style of the videos as suggesting Un A was “overseas educated” and “close to power.” 

“Un A sounds like she’s trained in China,” Song Ji-young, a Senior Lecturer at the Asia Institute of the University of Melbourne, says.

“[There’s] definitely Chinese influence and a daughter of a senior party member, not difficult to guess,” she added. “I wonder if she’s related to the Kims: such a usual choice for a North Korean presenter/reporter (with glasses).” 

Those distributing her content online also seem to be somewhat in the dark about her life. Responding to one commenter asking about a wedding ring on Un A’s left hand, the “Echo DPRK” account — which has previously insisted to not be a DPRK citizen — says: “I don’t know if she is married or not.” 

In another comment, they refer to obtaining the videos through a “source,” suggesting, at least on the surface, some distance between her team and the social media accounts distributing their work online.

“DEBUNKING” FAKE NEWS

Mysteries about her background notwithstanding, it’s clear Un A — or at least someone working with her — pays keen attention to what international media says about North Korea. 

Last month, amid widespread speculation about the state of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s health, NK News and other outlets, citing sources in Pyongyang, reported “panic buying” had been observed underway at select shops in the DPRK capital — and that shortages of imported goods were prompting locals to stock up. 

But in an unprecedented and prompt video response, Un A was just days later reported to have taken to the streets of the DPRK capital, ostensibly to find out whether the claims were true. 

“Hello, today is April 24, and I’m here for reason,” she told viewers — in what would become her most-viewed video on Youtube. “Recently a western media reported about DPRK’s economy, so I’m here today to check it out.”

Un A takes to the streets in response to western media reports 

The camera then follows our humble correspondent to a nearby supermarket, where locals are quick to insist, of course, that there is no panic buying taking place and all is well.

“I didn’t notice,” says one shopper, seemingly somewhat taken aback by the on-the-spot interview.

Another suggests some goods may be getting even cheaper, and another says that while prices of imported products may rise, “who wants imported goods now?”

It doesn’t take long, of course, for Un A to conclude that foreign media’s reporting was inaccurate — and urge viewers to steer clear of misinformation. 

“I think the fake news is the last thing we need in such fierce battle time with COVID-19, and it is another reason that we should keep vigilance for,” she says. 

That “battle” against COVID-19 has also inspired plenty of content, with Un A devoting substantial time to reiterating Pyongyang’s contentious claims to have no cases of the virus within its territory.

One such video, “What’s up Pyongyang? Coivd19 [sic] situation in DPRK,” sees our humble correspondent take to the streets of the North Korean capital to highlight life after lockdown in one of the world’s few countries free from the coronavirus — and prove the naysayers wrong, of course.

“Many analysts and critics pointed out China as DPRK’s main economic partners, and as a crack existing among extremely tough sanctions,” she says. “They forecasted DPRK economy would fall soon enough in such severe isolation.”

“But the result is showing something different, something of the exact opposite,” she continues. “The word crisis has worked as… an opportunity for Korean people to improve its own economic potential and capability, and its own economic independence.”

These “True or False” videos are sometimes crude, however, and are unlikely to convince the more skeptical viewer. 

For example, one shop fully stocked with domestic goods is cited as evidence that “all shops” in the DPRK are well-equipped.

Another video, too, claims North Koreans have no need to worry about price rises or food shortages “since all goods and foodstuff are home produced,” only for an interviewee in a subsequent film to say they believe the prices of imported goods will rise. 

It’s hard to overstate what a shift this real-time “debunking” of international media reporting represents for North Korean state media — not known for its quick-fire approach to breaking news.

Pyongyang has long put out statements refuting or dismissing claims by hostile governments and foreign press — often in the form of ill-tempered missives from the country’s foreign ministry — but this kind of social media-friendly style is new.

“Being able to dispute any statement from international media/other sources in such a believable and approachable manner is quite concerning,” Teodora Gyupchanova, Director of International Communications at the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) in Seoul, tells NK News. 

“The very fact that they are keeping track of what is being written/said about North Korea is not new,” she stresses. “It is known that there are state officials that are specifically tasked with the monitoring of any mention of North Korea in overseas sources.” 

“However, the new element is the quick response, this also gives us an idea what North Korea itself considers a priority among all the statements made about the state.” 

Sandra Fahy — an academic who has written about North Korea propaganda’s use of video in smear campaigns against prominent defectors — is also concerned about the possibilities of this kind of medium. 

“They are getting more slick,” she says. “There are risks and opportunities with these things, as I see it – for all involved (DPRK, rights activists, etc).”

FOREIGN INFLUENCES?

North Korea, of course, isn’t the first authoritarian state to experiment with more social media-friendly self-promotion. Both Russia and China — two of the DPRK’s closest partners — have spent millions on slick English-language media outlets aimed at sharing their take on the world. 

Moscow’s Russia Today (RT), for example, and its affiliated outlets, has garnered millions of likes and followers with its slick, often sarcastic, and sometimes genuinely compelling content, aimed at promoting the Kremlin and its allies’ view of everything from the war in Syria to U.S. foreign policy. 

Far from the stuffy Soviet propaganda of yore, RT has thrived through its use of articulate presenters with fluent English and high production values — and many of its viewers may not even be aware they are consuming content explicitly aimed at promoting the Russian government’s interests. 

Perhaps less successful, but equally pervasive across social media, is the international arm of Beijing’s China Central Television, CGTN, which also harnesses a team of English-speaking correspondents to “debunk” Western reports about widespread ethnic cleansing in the country’s Xinjiang province or U.S. claims about the origins of the COVID-19 virus.

Could Pyongyang, then, be learning propaganda lessons from its sometimes-partners in Moscow and Beijing?  

“They are possibly learning this from Russia and China and making use of technology to spread misinformation,” says Fahy, the academic. “I imagine this stuff could speak nicely to that contingent of folks who are sympathetic with the DPRK… as you know quite a few of those on Twitter and in the U.S.”

The idea of cooperation between North Korean state media and its counterparts in China and Russia has been broached in the past, too. 

2019 saw delegations of both executives from Russia’s state media companies and top officials from China’s People’s Daily and Xinhua outlets visit Pyongyang — visits accompanied by high-level discussions on cooperation in fighting “fake news.”

But others see a more benign influence in Un A’s vignettes of life in Pyongyang, instead suggesting the content is more similar to the kind of video put out by tourists who visit the DPRK.

“It actually reminds me more of some of the travel vlogs popular among young expats in Japan and South Korea,” said Meredith Shaw, the University of Tokyo researcher. 

“It’s the same style you would see on some of the videos done by foreigners who took the guided tours of North Korea that abound on YouTube these days,” she explained. 

“I could easily see people in the propaganda department analyzing those videos and seeing an opportunity to make their own version.”

North Korea, Shaw posits, may even have taken inspiration from another social media-friendly one-time denizen of Pyongyang: former Kim Il Sung university student Alek Sigley.

Sigley built up a substantial following on Twitter with his unique take on life in the DPRK, before his subsequent arrest and deportation from the country on charges of espionage provoked, in part, by articles he had written for NK News.

“I wonder if this is a result of someone taking note on the popularity of Alek Sigley’s brief social media presence in Pyongyang,” Shaw says. 

“It seems likely that some understood the value of developing savvier social media, particularly showcasing Pyongyang, but with a messenger who is more in tune with the Party and its propaganda.”

LIMITATIONS OF THE FORM 

But while clearly an attempt to push back against criticism of North Korea with a relatable, English-speaking host, there are times where the slick, modern style veers off into propaganda slogans and censorship.

In one video where Un A is espousing the great sporting spirit of the North Korean people, she tells the camera and viewer to look ahead at some joggers enjoying their free time along the river. 

The camera pans forward, but instead of the joggers the eye is drawn to a giant pixelated mass in the center of the screen — a partly-built 30-story tower by the Korea Kumgang Group (KKG), likely obscured to prevent outsiders from getting an update on the apparently sensitive construction. 

In another video, a puddle near Kim Il Sung University entrance is pixelated, potentially to obscure the shoes of the passing students, with a video featuring a different host under the “My Life in Pyongyang” series also appearing to specifically blur someone’s boots in the background.

One goal could be to obscure foreign brands, a common technique used by DPRK state outlets keen to push an image of a self-reliant country free of foreign products.

Sogwang also appears to be sensitive over product prices, pixelating visible price tags on shelves in Un A’s first video, shot at the Daesong Department Store supermarket.

Whether Sogwang has received standardized or modified censorship guidelines from the state is unclear, considering even KCTV blurs and pixelates sometimes apparently for no good reason, but the examples of overt censorship are clear signs of state control over the content.

Another reminder the videos are indeed produced by a North Korean state media company are the familiar, stilted lines of praise for “respected Marshal Kim Jong Un” sprinkled among Un A’s more personalized tone.

In a video once again claiming “ZERO” cases of COVID-19 in the country, she cites the wisdom of the leader as the top “secret for the success.” 

“Lucky for us that we have our respected Marshal, and our socialist system to rely on,” she adds.

Twitter, YouTube, and Weibo pages pushing the Un A videos often revert back to typical state media form. Echo and @coldnoodlefan, for example, have posted 32 videos on the alleged achievements of founding leader Kim Il Sung in the last three weeks.

Watching these videos, it’s clear Un A is thoughtful and well-educated — as well as aware of goings-on outside North Korea in a way few of her compatriots are. 

In one video, for example, she laments the fact the “whole world is immersed in the virtual world, right?”

“They prefer e-sports, with their fingers, rather than real sports,” she says.

Un A among the people earlier in the year

But the censorship and other goings-on in the background of the videos are a reminder that behind the inviting personality of the host and the hip “What’s up Pyongyang” titles, they are at their core a state media production limited by notions of the cult-of-personality, hostility to the outside world, and efforts to conceal much of the reality of life in the DPRK.

Despite this, it’s clear the initiative is worth paying attention to and, the limitations of the form aside, is offering a more responsive and open view of North Korean life that what can be typically seen on state media. 

“It’s good to see the real Pyongyang streets and landscape, much more than what she says or who she interviews with (kind of obvious),” the University of Melbourne’s Song Ji-young says. “Overall, I think it’s a good sign they try to engage with the international audience.” 

Others argue the very fact that such an initiative has emerged from North Korea is notable — especially at a time when the country is increasingly closed-off to the outside world and amid signs of a hyper-securitization process in the DPRK.

That reality notwithstanding, the NKDB’s Teodora Gyupchanova says, makes the videos a useful “second layer of information” about goings-on in North Korea. 

“If the DPRK has decided to explore this kind of communication channel, I think we should listen.”

Edited by Chad O’Carroll and James Fretwell