North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, its second this year, hasn’t done much for its already fairly shaky standing on the international stage. It doesn’t look like everyone’s going to be sitting around the negotiating table anytime soon, and that the impetus to punish the country for its blatant disregard for international law will win out – for good reason. 

But the shape of how this will affect the already heavy sanctions against the country, however, remains unclear.

TARGETED CRACKDOWN

March’s sanctions saw a lot of fanfare from the security council, and after tortured negotiations, Resolution 2270 placed strict restrictions on North Korea’s international shipping, international trade, and its overseas representatives.

Proponents of sanctions argue that not nearly enough has been done to make North Korea accountable, and that significantly more can be done to cut off supplies of money to the isolated state.

But ultimately, “the new sanctions have not been a game changer,” argues Tristan Webb, a former Senior DPRK Research Analyst for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, speaking over email to NK News. In short, they self-evidently aren’t preventing what they set out to do: stop North Korea testing another nuclear weapon.

“This time, again, the least surprising response from the UNSC will be for it to: condemn the nuclear test; designate several new DPRK entities; and tighten some of the existing sanctions measures,” Webb says.

Proponents of sanctions argue that not nearly enough has been done to make North Korea accountable, and that there are many more steps that could be taken to cut off supplies of money to the isolated state.

Josh Stanton, a prominent proponent of sanctions in the North Korea-watching community, argued in a blog post that a number of parties, from the state airline Air Koryo to the company that insures its assets, the Korea Shipowners’ Protection and Indemnity Association, could and should be targeted. From Stanton’s point of view, everything from cracking down on North Korea’s labor exports to banning tourist travel would be fair game.

“Although U.S. and U.N. sanctions are much stronger than the sham sanctions we had in place until March, they’re still weaker than Iran sanctions were two years ago,” he tells NK News. “If we designate Air Koryo, and North Korea’s shipping and insurance companies, Pyongyang will have to rely on third-country air carriers, shippers, and insurance companies that will be more reluctant to break sanctions.”

CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES

Of course, it’s not as though North Korea isn’t already under one of the most advanced and far-reaching sanctions regimes one earth. Over the last decade, as the country has increasingly flouted international law, more and more has been placed under international controls.

But many question the extent to which the March’s sanctions are being fully enforced as much as they could: even President Obama has acknowledged there are “loopholes” which need to be closed.

“We must enforce the sanctions we already have,” says Stanton. “The Panel of Experts has named dozens of North Korea’s agents, bankers, and arms clients. We can’t expect this behavior to change if we aren’t willing to freeze assets and impose secondary sanctions on violators and enablers.”

…even President Obama has acknowledged there are “loopholes” which need to be closed.

Experts point to a range of other areas where sanctions could be extended and hit the regime where it really hurts.

“Some argue that one area ripe for further tightening is the list of prohibited luxury goods, which is currently very short,” argues Webb. “This is an uncontentious but high-profile area of sanctions, and adding to the list will give the appearance of the UN actually doing something.”

Evens Revere, a former top negotiator, says he’ll leave it up to policymakers in Washington to work out where sanctions can be extended – but has a few ideas about where they could start. They could target the country’s deposits in overseas banking institutions, for example, or take measures against firms doing business in North Korea, as well as “overt and covert things” that could twist the knife.

“It is widely known that the level of sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the U.S. and the international community are only a fraction of those that were imposed on Iran,” he says. “It is now time for the international community to take appropriate action to recognize the ominous challenge that North Korea is posing to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”

A NEW APPROACH?

Some disagree. If the traditional response to North Korean nuclear tests hasn’t worked, so the argument goes, why would they work this time? 

“I’ll probably remain in a minority, but I think that no action should be taken (since they won’t surrender their nukes, ever) and that the DPRK nuclear programme is actually not a big deal,” says Fyodor Tertitskiy, an NK News contributor and a Ph.D. candidate at Seoul National University. “North Korean nuclear tests do not kill people. Concentration camps do – actually they are doing it right now as well.

If the traditional response to North Korean nuclear tests hasn’t worked, so the argument goes, why would they work this time?

“Ideally, the DPRK-related policy should be not about atomics, but about attempting to pierce and ultimately dismantle the iron curtain surrounding the country and about feeding the hungry – thus giving them an opportunity to think about something bigger than just daily survival.”

Other more engagement-oriented experts agreed that a new approach is certainly needed.

“Pressure without negotiation has failed yet again,” says Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York, in an email. “So has insisting on preconditions for talks.”

The DPRK, in classic style, has claimed that the test was a response to the latest round of sanctions, passed by the UNSC in March – sanctions that were in turn a response to North Korea’s somewhat underwhelming test of an alleged hydrogen bomb back in January.

“This test was our countermeasure to the U.S. and our enemies who have sanctioned us, denied our strategic status as the proud nuclear power and have viciously criticized our acts based on our self-defensive rights,” state media said on the day of the test, with the implication that, had it not been for the restrictions imposed by the international community, the tests would not be taking place.

WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE

But critical to the sanctions question is how North Korea’s more sympathetic neighbors respond. Both China and Russia have condemned the test, but whether or not this condemnation will result in any change in policy remains to be seen.

“Figuring out what sanctions might look like in the wake of the fifth nuclear test depends almost entirely on what China is willing to do, not with respect to a new resolution itself but with respect to implementation,” says Stephan Haggard, a fellow at the Peterson School for International Economics. “There is no question that China has the potential to exercise leverage; its leverage, as measured by the simple statistic of the share of North Korean trade with the country, may now exceed 90%.”

Also critical to the sanctions question is how North Korea’s more sympathetic neighbors respond.

In the past, however, China hasn’t been all too keen to join its partners on the Security Council – and its traditional rivals in Washington and Seoul – in making life difficult for Pyongyang.

OTHER INTERESTS AT PLAY

Much of this has to do with the old geopolitics of the peninsula: China is concerned about “stability”, of course, and the recent argument about THAAD deployment in South Korea has not made Beijing eager to lend a hand.

“This does not mean that China is doing nothing; it only means that their approach to sanctions enforcement has been cautious and gradual.”

But there are also economic concerns among Chinese policymakers about the consequences of a sanctions crackdown.

“In any case, coal was supposed to be completely sanctioned, but is only off 12% from same period year on year, which is about what overall trade with China is off. I don’t think coal is driving total trade,” says Haggard. “In other words; larger macro trends are driving total trade and most significant sanctions—coal—are not being enforced that rigorously.

“This does not mean that China is doing nothing; it only means that their approach to sanctions enforcement has been cautious and gradual.”

With the news that China will oppose unilateral sanctions against North Korea and is arguing for “peaceful settlement through dialogue as soon as possible”, and that Russia-DPRK economic relations are set to continue “regardless of sanctions”, whether or not North Korea’s only real allies will match their strong condemnations with action remains to be seen.

“It is possible that China will—at some point—reach the end of its rope and respond in a way which does not force economic collapse or crisis, but forces a change in the North Korean line,” argues Haggard. “This seems unlikely but not impossible; as a result, the negotiations at the UN are likely to be long and relatively unproductive because whatever is agreed can be reversed in implementation.”