Numerous press reports that DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointwoman Choi Sung Hui, during the recent NEACD meeting near Beijing, “declared the Six-Party Talks dead” and vowed that no denuclearization is in the cards were perceived as a sort of a landmark. However, there is nothing new in these declarations. The “nuclear deterrent” is an existential matter enshrined in the DPRK Constitution. The Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea made it clear that improving nuclear and missile capabilities is the basic course of the state and party under the framework of Byungjin line and that no denuclearization may be expected. In the congress, the nuclear doctrine was announced and North Koreans now vow to increase their nuclear weapons “quantitatively and qualitatively.”

NORTH KOREA’S POSITION LAID BARE

What else became clear from the discussions at NEACD? North Korea now is a de facto nuclear country (much like India or Pakistan) and declares: “We do not care whether we are recognized as nuclear state or not.” They see the nuclear deterrent as the only credible one; also, they argue it is cheaper than a conventional deterrent. Moreover, North Koreans declare their “right” for “preventative strikes” if they find out “for sure” that “a nuclear power” is about to attack.

Pyongyang stressed the difference between the existing nuclear weapons and its nuclear programs

On the other hand, North Koreans have already made it clear on many occasions that they will be prepared – or at least do not totally exclude such a possibility – for denuclearizing along with the full denuclearization of the world. So even a signing of a Pyongyang-proposed “peace treaty” with the U.S. does not mean denuclearization: It would only usher in the start of the process “to alleviate Washington’s concerns.” However, Pyongyang stressed the difference between the existing nuclear weapons and its nuclear programs: While the first are “untouchable,” the second can be “discussed,” curtailed and even stopped under certain conditions – in other words, reciprocal steps ensuring DPRK’s security on the part of the U.S.

It should be understood that North Korea is in an asymmetric security situation: There are far fewer concessions it can make against a wide variety of concessions by its adversaries. So, “action for action,” the guiding principle of the Six-Party Talks, is in fact not conducive to North Korea’s interests. Also, the concessions demanded from North Korea are generally irreversible (eliminating nuclear weapons), while those of other members of the standoff, are easily reversible (sanctions, papers signed, assurances, economic concessions, etc.). There is actually not even a single irreversible concession by the U.S. that Pyongyang can consider the right price for giving away its nuclear card. So any diplomatic or non-diplomatic efforts presuming denuclearization prior to reaching a comprehensive agreement on security guarantees to North Korea are doomed to failure.

In that sense the old Six-Party Talks are really “dead”; they were convened when North Korea had no nuclear weapons and the actual aim of the talks was to prevent their appearance. The situation today is different. North Koreans argue that the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005 is also “dead” because it was adopted before the first nuclear test, and they blame the U.S. for “disrupting the spirit” of this document by failing to carry out its obligations and “hostile actions” like sanctions etc.

So what the latest NEACD meeting has really shown is that we have no leverage to persuade North Koreans to denuclearize. Sanctions may slow the programs by making practical implementation difficult, but they won’t make the North Korean leadership change their policy or make concessions, although the latest set of sanctions, including the unilateral ones, can be quite harmful to North Korean economy.

However, North Koreans would adapt even to stricter sanctions, although at a cost. This country is not Iran, which was more dependent on international trade when sanctions were imposed on them. Also, investment into the nuclear program is now probably not as great as in its initial stages. However, the lack of funds may prompt cuts in expenditures on conventional weapons and strengthen reliance on the nuclear deterrent. That makes its elimination even more doubtful.

A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION?

However, what is important is that North Korea has made it clear it can stop further improvement and tests if she receives some concessions; you cannot go in reverse without stopping first. So the freezing of the nuclear and missile programs is the most viable strategy for today. This gives at least some hope for dismantlement in the future (North Korea slowed down its programs in 1990s when it hoped for the success of the Agreed Framework and made some steps to disable facilities in 2007).

This way should be explored by way of dialogue, probably with the start of a new U.S. administration (so far the U.S.-North Korea contacts have been fruitless and Pyongyang is unlikely to make strategically oriented deals with the outgoing Obama administration). In fact, North Koreans can wait: They are the ones who can now exercise “strategic patience.”

The restarting of the diplomatic process may begin with the preliminary Track II comparison of positions – and it should start now

The restarting of the diplomatic process may begin with the preliminary Track II comparison of positions – and it should start now, as the body of experts in all countries remains largely the same despite changes in political regimes. However, U.S.-DPRK direct contact and reaching some agreement on general terms on bilateral basis is crucial. And then the Six-Party Talks may be “reborn” on a new basis, with the agenda covering not only denuclearization, but the comprehensive security system on the Korean Peninsula

A peace arrangement should be made by means of multilateral dialogue between the former adversaries in the Korean War, which should be guaranteed by all six parties and controlled by the UN. A “peace declaration” making use of the language from the Basic Agreement between the two Koreas (1991), as well as the language of the October 12, 2000, U.S.-North Korean joint communiqué (“neither government would have hostile intent toward the other,” “the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity)” might be adopted as a result. Then the six parties could proceed to a politically and legally binding multilateral treaty (i.e. “On Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia”). Another option is a set of bilateral treaties between each of the six parties which would regulate relations between them concerning the Korea issue. A mechanism to monitor and control the implementation of these agreements (reporting to UN) could be created, serving a basis for a future Northeast Asia security organization.

Unfortuntely it all seems so far off today. But there is no other solution (apart from an unlikely regime change) for the nuclear conundrum.