Until the moment news broke that the United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed to pass new harsh sanctions against North Korea, it was reasonable to brace for failure. All signs indicated that China was going to veto it. After all, China had told Secretary of State John Kerry that it was not willing to take steps that risked destabilizing the North Korean regime as recently as January – after North Korea had conducted its fourth nuclear test.

Possible reasons for China’s sudden 180-degree turn are numerous. China could have genuinely felt threatened by South Korea’s decision to deploy the THAAD system or China could have been responding to the US’s sanctions against North Korea that could seriously affect Chinese banks. Or maybe the rocket launch was the straw that broke the camel’s back, especially considering that China was already annoyed with the nuclear test, which it had not been informed of ahead of time.

If this new set of sanctions is enforced, the pressure could seriously undermine Kim Jong Un’s ability to keep the elites in check

If this new set of sanctions is enforced, the pressure could seriously undermine Kim Jong Un’s ability to keep the elites in check. This, in turn, could force Kim Jong Un to be (relatively) more amenable in future negotiations with South Korea or the United States. However, despite agreeing to the sanctions, one important questions remains: Can China be trusted to hold up its end of the agreement?

As far as China’s Korea policy is concerned, its underlying philosophy remains unchanged – no war, no instability, no nukes – and precisely in that order. China’s opposition to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has never been a secret. So China’s agreement to endorse the sanctions, though surprising, is understandable. However, the denuclearization of North Korea is not nearly as important to China as maintaining peace and stability. So it is difficult to imagine that China will continue to indefinitely adhere to the sanctions regime.

As China is North Korea’s largest and most important trade partner, its chief supplier of oil, and its only ally, it is difficult to overstate China’s importance to ensuring that the sanctions work. Therefore, when the Chinese Commerce Ministry ordered a Chinese company to halt all coal trade with North Korea as well as forced its banks to cease transferring yuan and dollars to North Korea, it could not have failed to send a chilling message to Kim Jong Un. But what was the intended message?

INCENTIVE TO CHEAT

No war, no instability: These are the two most important parts of China’s Korea policy that the rest of the world has to pay attention to. China has long claimed that the only way to ensure a peaceful resolution to North Korea’s nuclear standoff is via the Six-Party Talks and that is still its goal. When North Korea holds its Workers’ Party Congress in May, the first time such a congress will be held in 36 years, it is widely assumed that important policy changes will be announced. China is most likely hoping that its recent decisions and public positions toward its renegade ally will force Kim Jong Un to strike a much more conciliatory tone during the Workers’ Party Congress – namely, announcing his willingness to restart the currently defunct Six-Party Talks.

If things go according to plan, it could be a major win for China. As long as Kim Jong Un agrees to restart talks and takes a more conciliatory tone – and perhaps even agree to liberalize its economy à la Deng Xiaoping – even if Kim Jong Un is insincere, which he most definitely will be – it will once again stave off war and instability. It will definitely further cement the status quo and will buy more time for Kim Jong Un and his minions, but it will guarantee that there will be no war or instability, which China values more than North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons.

However, to ensure that things go according to plan, China has to wield both a stick and a carrot. The sanctions are the stick. And considering North Korea’s latest round of tantrums, it is clear that the unanimously agreed upon UN sanctions are having at least their initially hoped-for effect. But what will the carrot be comprised of?

… it becomes important for China to cheat on its agreement because it will need to give Kim Jong Un something in order to goad him out of his shell

A complete economic collapse is not in China’s interests. If that were to happen, it could create a massive refugee crisis in China, which would be anathema to its “no instability” policy. Even without having to consider a complete national collapse, it becomes important for China to cheat on its agreement because it will need to give Kim Jong Un something in order to goad him out of his shell. As such, it is more than likely that China will do everything it can to find and abuse every single legal loophole that it can find in the sanctions regime.

Over time, when things inevitably cool down and fewer people are paying attention to North Korea, China’s own internal politics will effectively make the sanctions toothless. There are two ways to ensure that China does not cheat.

The first method is to ensure that the U.S. Treasury Department remains vigilant and shows willingness to punish any bank in the world that dares to abuse the sanctions. The second method is for South Korea to remain coy and ambiguous about its intention to deploy the THAAD system. However, relying on the U.S. Treasury Department to do its job is certainly not a fool-proof method considering the fact that major changes could occur next year when a new president and (perhaps) new members of Congress are elected – and what a circus American elections are turning out to be. It is also unclear whether South Korea can be ambiguous about its intention to deploy the THAAD system. For one thing, the South Korean government would need to convince the South Korean people that gambling with the country’s existential security is a wise decision and it also needs to consider that in its attempt to upset neither Beijing nor Washington, it could end up upsetting both.

Andrew Jackson once supposedly said, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!” Can China be trusted to hold up its end of the agreement? Will the safeguards in place ensure that China continues to cooperate? We have reason to remain skeptical.