Views expressed in Opinion articles are exclusively the authors’ own and do not represent those of NK News.

On the afternoon of June 16, the sound of a massive explosion announced to the world that North Korea had triumphantly demolished the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong.

The destruction of what was until recently one of the few symbols of “North-South cooperation” marks the latest escalation in Pyongyang’s now-week-long strategy of building tension.

North Korea is doing pretty much what the vast majority of observers have expected them to do: escalating.

And frankly, given their circumstances and track record, we can assume this spectacular blast is merely the first step down the escalation path.

At first glance, North Korea’s actions might appear irrational. Opponents of the Moon Jae-in government often accuse it of being too pro-Pyongyang, and more radical types even believe that the President’s secret goal is some kind of confederation with North Korea on, naturally, North Korea’s terms.

This is a conspiracy theory though, and one that the South Korean right is increasingly fond of.

But it does appear at first glance that the Moon administration’s policy toward the North has been remarkably soft.

Every few weeks, South Korean officials approach their Northern counterparts with another nice-sounding proposal for cooperation, even though these proposals are either ignored or openly rejected by Pyongyang.

But upon closer examination, it’s clear that all of Moon’s “reconciliation efforts” only ever propose cooperation that is unlikely to be seen as a violation of the existing sanctions regime.

Seoul’s policy planners are usually careful not to suggest anything that could seriously irritate Washington, and given the comprehensiveness of UN Security Council sanctions and the unusually tough U.S. position, South Korea’s cautious approach means they can only suggest purely symbolic or humanitarian projects.

But soccer matches or joint archeological digs are not the kinds of projects North Korea wants.

The Moon government’s grassroots supporters, largely left-leaning nationalists, are surprised, and judging by the recent reactions, somewhat offended by Pyongyang’s attitude.

Yet their own delusions blind them to the obvious. North Korea is not run by fellow nationalistic idealists, but by a team of hyper-realists who care little for emotionally-charged symbolism or ideology, including that of a leftist or nationalistic nature.

North Korea’s leadership has always believed that politics is about power and money, and acts accordingly.

Pyongyang doesn’t want flashy K-pop concerts. They want a full-scale revival of the Sunshine Policy, meaning getting those assembly lines at the Kaesong Industrial Complex going and those hotels at the Mount Kumgang tourist resort packed with fee-paying South Korean tourists.

President Moon would even be ready to subsidize such activities but, being a practically-minded politician, is aware of his dilemma.

He and his party do gain from a properly-maintained impression of “North-South reconciliation”; however, such gains pale in comparison with the consequences should Seoul provoke an angry outburst from the White House.

Indeed, there are few reasons to doubt that Donald Trump would not look too kindly should U.S. ally South Korea begin providing direct aid or subsidies to a country that has been so remarkably successful in building nuclear weapons and ICBMs aimed at America.

To find a way out of the dilemma, Moon for a long time pinned his hope on theatrical gestures like the above-mentioned humanitarian and symbolic projects. But the North Koreans saw through his scheme — not a difficult task — and kept rejecting his proposals.

These frequent rejections did not disappoint President Moon or his close advisors. They were actually doing what was quite rational in their situation: striving for improved relations with the North without offending the U.S.

North Korea’s leadership has always believed that politics is about power and money, and acts accordingly

The time has come, however, that the North Korean leadership has decided to teach South Korea a lesson.

Pyongyang’s current goal is to demonstrate to the South that North Korea, if seriously annoyed by Seoul’s inaction, is also capable of making a mess — maybe not as dangerous and impressive a mess that Donald Trump could create, but a mess nonetheless. This is exactly what they are doing now.

Of course, one should not take the “leaflets issue” too seriously; it’s clearly just a pretext, not the reason, for North Korean bellicosity.

While the balloon launches might be interpreted as a violation of the existing agreement, the North Koreans themselves have not been reluctant to violate the same agreement in the recent past.

One could argue that decision to make leaflets the point of contention was pretty random. North Korea could have easily chosen some caricatures depicting the Supreme Leader in an unfavorable light or some remarks by Channel A anchors as a pretext for their well-designed outburst of righteous anger.

What should we expect next? In her statement on June 4, Kim Yo Jong already provided a list of measures likely to be taken to demonstrate the North’s disapproval of what it sees as the South’s duplicity.

The liaison office is gone for now, and we can expect explosions at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tourist zone soon.

Will the North Koreans go further? Will they, for example, attack South Korean territory, repeating what they did in 2010 with Yeonpyeong-do island shelling? Will they try to attack prominent defectors or their groups? Will they shell areas used for the balloon launches?

While it’s too early to say, I personally believe that such “deep escalation” is possible, but not very likely.

We are just at the very beginning of the crisis though, so there are probably many more sudden developments to come.

Judging by previous experience and common sense, we shouldn’t expect too much from South Korea’s reaction to the situation.

The Moon administration knows that it has nothing to gain by actively reacting to North Korean provocations. If it strikes back, it will just further worsen the situation.

Any (over)reaction would undermine one of the current government’s major claims to fame: their alleged ability to sort things out with Pyongyang.

Most likely then, Seoul will play down the significance of ongoing events in the (maybe, but not necessarily, vain) hope that North and South will go back to the established mood of broad smiles and pleasant-sounding proposals.

At any rate, recent events are once again showing what has been known for a long time: that we shouldn’t take periodic North-South lovefest — like the lovefest we witnessed almost exactly two years ago at Panmunjom.

All the talk about “historic turning points” is naive and occasionally misleading. North Korea is still what it has always been: a small, poor country, run by people who are smart, hyper-realistic, and care about money and power above all else.

Edited by Oliver Hotham