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Two trends have dominated news about North Korea in recent months.

First, Kim Jong Un’s health. The Supreme Leader disappeared for three weeks in April, TMZ inaccurately reported that he died, and the internet went into meltdown. He reappeared at a fertilizer plant on May 1, 2020.

Second, his sister Kim Yo Jong’s increasing prominence. The 32-year old was removed as an alternate member of the Korean Workers’ Party Political Bureau in April 2019 but was reappointed in April 2020.

Then in June 2020, a series of vitriolic statements attributed to Kim Yo Jong towards South Korea were carried by the Rodong Sinmun ahead of North Korea blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office at Kaesong.

Kim Jong Un’s health and Kim Yo Jong’s rise have caused a lot of rumors.

Some analysts claim Kim Yo Jong is now the effective number two in the regime. Others urge caution in making such claims.

But unless analysts have a direct line to Kim Jong Un or incredibly well-placed sources inside North Korea, this is all speculation.

However, comparative political science research provides interesting suggestions about the implications of Kim Jong Un’s health and his family situation for the North Korean leadership.

In short, there is no reason to expect authoritarianism in North Korea to fall anytime soon, but the Kim regime now has notable weaknesses that it has arguably not had since the mid-1950s (when Kim Il Sung fought off challenges from regime elites).

KIM JONG UN’S HEALTH

When Kim reappeared at the fertilizer plant in May, he had a mark on his right wrist that some medical experts believe may be from a cardiovascular procedure.

Kim’s family also has a history of heart disease: his father, Kim Jong Il, and grandfather, Kim Il Sung, died suddenly after heart attacks.

And, as Anna Fifield points out in her book on Kim Jong Un, he’s about five feet seven inches and weighs around three hundred pounds. This level of obesity significantly elevates his risk of heart disease.

This matters because a dictator’s continued ability to rule is uncertain when they’re experiencing ill-health. In turn, this creates doubts among key supporters that the dictator will be able to reward them in the future.

These doubts undermine loyalty.

Think of the Shah in Iran in 1979. His treatment for cancer is widely believed to have weakened the resolve of his key supporters – after all, why defend a leader who will soon be dead? – and helped facilitate the Iranian Revolution.

Kim Jong Un’s young age would suggest he could rule for decades. But his body mass index, recent disappearance and potential cardiovascular procedure, and his disappearance and reemergence with a limp in 2014 all create uncertainty about his long-term ability to lead.

KIM JONG UN’S FAMILY

A dictator’s poor health, however, doesn’t have to be a problem as long as there’s a clear succession plan.

An ideal succession plan for dictators deters coups while they’re still alive and enables them to subsequently hand over power peacefully.

The optimal solution is hereditary succession, where a dictator hands over power to a child, as Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il both achieved.

This has advantages over other types of succession, including where power is transferred to a sibling (maybe Kim Yo Jong) or to an especially powerful ally (Choe Ryong Hae, perhaps).

While these other types of succession clear up uncertainty over who will inherit power, they do not solve what’s known as the ‘crown-prince’ problem.

This refers to how designating a successor imbues them with power. The successor thus often has an incentive and opportunity to mount a coup.

Hereditary succession solves the crown-prince problem as the child of a dictator can afford to wait since they’re notably younger than the incumbent. At some point, they will inherit power.

Kim Jong Un currently lacks a credible hereditary successor. He is thought to have three young children, including at least one son, but none of them are old enough that they could rule if Kim Jong Un were to die.

HOW CAN THIS PLAY OUT?

If Kim Jong Un is having health troubles, he can’t designate a young child as successor.

Prospective successors including Kim Yo Jong (sister), Kim Jong Chol (brother), or prominent elites. The scenario is the same whoever Kim Jong Un picks, but let’s play it out with Kim Yo Jong given her current high-profile.

Designating Kim Yo Jong as successor would imbue her with power. It would also provide her, and those associated with her, a motive to consider a coup.

If Kim Jong Un lives for decades and Kim Yo Jong remains the “de facto No.2,” she may believe that she would never get to rule without challenging Kim Jong Un.

Alternatively, Kim Jong Un may survive for another ten years but then want to switch the line of succession to one of his children.

Would Kim Yo Jong and those around her, or any other designated successor, accept such degradation of power?

The Kim regime now has notable weaknesses that it has arguably not had since the mid-1950s

There are numerous examples from dictatorships around the world of scorned elites mounting coups against dictators. Idi Amin did in Uganda to overthrow Milton Obote, Pervez Musharraf did against Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, and Ansumane Mané did against João Bernando Vieira in Guinea-Bissau, to name a few examples.

Additionally, recent history suggests the Kim family is not squeamish about using violence against each other.

WHY THIS MATTERS

North Korea’s structures of authoritarian rule are so strong that there is little reason to believe that Kim Jong Un’s departure would mark the beginning of any kind of transition to democracy.

More generally, when an autocracy falls, more often than not another autocratic regime takes its place.

But leadership transitions, especially unexpected ones, can create uncertainty.

If a leadership transition in North Korea doesn’t go to plan, elite infighting may occur. There could be fragmented control over North Korea’s arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons, a nightmare scenario for Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

Even if Kim Jong Un rules for years, we must take the prospect of his vulnerability seriously.

This means closely watching for signals about succession and planning accordingly, and carefully analyzing elite politics to understand who is and who will be the major players in North Korea.

Edited by Oliver Hotham