Views expressed in Opinion articles are exclusively the authors’ own and do not represent the views of NK News. 

North Korea has a long history of failure when it comes to achieving one of its key foreign policy priorities: the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations with the United States.

This goal dates back to at least 1974, when the Supreme People’s Assembly requested this in a letter sent to the U.S. Congress. Forty years later, the United States has diplomatic relations with former communist foes China, Cuba, and Vietnam – but not with North Korea.

There are many reasons behind this failure. One of them, however, stands out: North Korea has been unable to work together with South Korea to implicitly, or even explicitly, push the United States toward normalization of diplomatic relations. This is a historical mistake on the part of North Korea.

In fact, Pyongyang’s recent treatment of the Moon Jae-in administration suggests that the Kim Jong Un regime has not learned the lesson from his father, especially, and grandfather’s time.

North Korean media has hurled personal insults at Moon even though he did more than anyone else to first bring Chairman Kim out of his diplomatic freeze. Pyongyang has also repeatedly rejected the many overtures that Seoul has made since the collapse of the Hanoi summit.

In other words, North Korea is doing everything possible to antagonize the very country it should be trying to work with.

Certainly, there are good reasons why Pyongyang might not want to seek the support of Seoul on this matter.

For one, South Korea is more successful that its northern neighbor in pretty much every metric except possession of nuclear weapons. Also, the Kim regime might think that it is condescending to assume that it cannot conduct its foreign policy without the help of South Korea.

However, even if North Korea believes so and is also insincere about its stated wish to improve relations with South Korea, it would make sense to work together with Seoul from a self-interested strategic point of view. There are several reasons for this.

To begin with, Moon is the third South Korean president after Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to actively prioritize better inter-Korean relations over any other foreign policy goal.

But it is not a given that future presidents will do the same. Indeed, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye considered a strong alliance with the United States to be a bigger priority.

Showing Seoul that Pyongyang values administrations that prioritize inter-Korean reconciliation would go a long way in ensuring that future presidents will continue doing this.

North Korea is doing everything possible to antagonize the very country it should be trying to work together with

Furthermore, a pro-engagement South Korean administration puts pressure on the United States to engage as well. Two cases stand out.

President Bill Clinton made a move to improve relations with North Korea toward the end of his time in office. This was due to, among other factors, the election of Kim Dae-jung.

The first liberal president in South Korean history, his approach toward North Korea helped to create the necessary environment for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to travel to Pyongyang and Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok to visit the White House.

The second case took place during the George W. Bush years. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun initially had a rocky relationship. But Roh’s pro-engagement approach was important in driving the Six-Party Talks process – including the 2005 joint statement and the two 2007 implementation agreements.

Indeed, Washington did take Seoul’s preferences into consideration when resetting its own North Korea policy during Bush’s second term in office.

On the other side of the spectrum, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye’s tougher stance on North Korea made it easier for President Barack Obama to pursue his ‘strategic patience’ approach.

Simply put, the Obama administration did not have any significant friction with Seoul as a result of its North Korea policy because it aligned with Lee and Park’s.

On South Korea’s role in helping successive U.S. governments decide their North Korea policy, it should be noted that more often than not Washington has tied U.S.-North Korea normalization discussions to an improvement in inter-Korean relations. This reality further underscores the link between pro-engagement South Korean administrations and Washington’s decision to negotiate.

Also, North Korea seems to underestimate the power that the message of inter-Korean reconciliation carries.

It is difficult as a matter of principle to argue that one is opposed to reconciliation between two parties at odds. Therefore, inter-Korean talks and steps toward better relations bring goodwill among the international community.

This includes the United States, where, it should be made clear, few political leaders or influential analysts are opposed to the idea of inter-Korean reconciliation.

It would make sense to work together with Seoul from a self-interested strategic point of view

The examples of the reconciliation processes between West and East Germany or Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland attests to this, however different they might be from the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The international community, including the United States, supported both processes. Similarly, there was also a high degree of support for the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000.

This was also the case with the three inter-Korean summits of 2018. The image of Moon and Kim holding hands and crossing the line separating both Koreas did more to improve Kim’s image than anything else he has done since he launched his diplomatic offensive, other than, possibly, Kim’s first meeting with President Donald Trump.

Crucially, the April 2018 inter-Korean summit boosted the image of Kim in South Korea as well. This includes conservatives, who tend to be more critical of North Korea’s behavior.

For once, the main topic of discussion was inter-Korean reconciliation rather than Pyongyang’s nuclear program or a North Korean missile test.

It would be wise for Kim to learn from history and understand that better inter-Korean relations provide direct support for Pyongyang’s long-term goal of the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Even if Kim thinks that Moon cannot influence Trump and that therefore he should focus on dealing with the U.S. President directly, the implementation of any possible U.S.-North Korea agreement will involve South Korea as well.

Even more importantly, Trump will be replaced by a new president at some point, and it’s very unlikely that whoever replaces him will be as dismissive of U.S. alliances. A Seoul opposed to diplomacy with North Korea could help sway Washington toward a less accommodative stance than Trump has taken since last year – and vice versa.

Ultimately, South Korean goodwill is a commodity that North Korea cannot take for granted and simply switch on and off at will.

The North’s tougher stance toward Moon has already drawn criticism in South Korea. For Pyongyang to achieve normalization of relations with the United States, it would be well advised to reverse its mistake of not working together with Seoul.

Edited by James Fretwell and Oliver Hotham