Confirming this was the fact that what mattered the most was not the actual ability of such regimes to attack the U.S. with WMDs, nor their behavior, but the type of regime armed, or presumed to be so, with such weapons.
After 2002, any hope of reconciliation collapsed
It was this U.S. emphasis and strategy on regime change that, once again, worsened the threat perceptions of North Korea and Iran and led to the end of the engagement and cooperation mood of the last years of the Clinton administration, both in East Asia and in the Middle East.
The Perry process to cope with the North Korea nuclear issue had been followed, at the end of 1990s, by the improvement of relations between the U.S. administration and the moderate Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, who called for dialogue with the West and with Washington.
But after 2002, any hope of reconciliation collapsed with the breakout of the second nuclear crisis in North Korea and the exit of the country from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), together with the end of the Agreed Framework (AF). This, ultimately, allowed Pyongyang continue to develop its nuclear program.
The revelation about two clandestine nuclear sites in Iran by an exiled Iranian resistance group, too, meant that within a year, the world realized that Tehran had built, or was building, everything it needed to produce enriched uranium. In March 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating Iran’s nuclear history.
Despite the U.S. administration’s strong words against the Kim regime and the clerical one in Tehran, in both scenarios, some attempts were made to solve the crises through a “dual track strategy” of pressure and dialogue.
Beginning in 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed several resolutions against North Korea and Iran in order to increase pressure on them to suspend their nuclear and ballistic missile development programs.
Some attempts were made to solve the crises through a “dual track strategy” of pressure and dialogue
However, at the end of the decade, no substantial progress had been made on either front. But while the SPT stalled over verification issues in 2008 – and the U.S. has refused to talk to Pyongyang unless specific preconditions are met – the door of diplomacy was never closed to Tehran.
From 2010 onward, the U.S. and the European Union strengthened sanctions against Iran, adding unilateral measures that hit the country’s energy sector and isolated it from the international financial system.
Negotiations went more smoothly after the election of the moderate Hassan Rouhani to the presidency of the country, and when Obama abandoned the unrealistic request of zero enrichment.
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that imposes restrictions on Iran’s stockpiles of uranium and its ability to enrich it – so it cannot build any bomb – ending the long-standing nuclear standoff.
Iran also accepted enhanced levels of IAEA monitoring. In return, Tehran can continue its research and development activities in a manner that does not violate the deal, and it befits from the lifting of the multilayered nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the UNSC, the EU, and the U.S., as Iran implements its obligations.
The inclusion of a “snap back” procedure in the deal make sure the reinstating of sanctions will take place should Iran be caught cheating. After fifteen years, all the constraints on Iranian nuclear development will be lifted.
The door of diplomacy was never closed to Tehran
FROM TEHRAN, TO PYONGYANG?
Since the JCPOA was signed, many have argued that the Iranian experience could offer lessons in persuading the Kim regime to also abandon its nuclear ambitions.
The crucial role played by sanctions in forcing Iran to compromise, many continue to say, should be viewed as a proof that such measures work.
However, these seems a rather superficial evaluation. These case studies differ for a number of reasons, from the two countries’ political systems and internal dynamics, to the motivations behind their pursuing of nuclear programs and the progress of their respective technology.
North Korea is already a de facto nuclear power. But, most important, the Kim regime has made clear that its “nuclear program is not a plaything to be put on the negotiating table, as it is the essential means to protect its sovereignty and vital rights from the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy.”
Until policy advisors and makers in Washington understand this basic notion about North Korea, they will never succeed in their efforts towards denuclearization. Kim Jong Un has based his legitimacy on the parallel development of the nuclear program and the economy under the Byungjin policy.
This kind of discourse has never been put forward by the Iranian leadership – that’s why it bargained the nuclear program away in favor of economic benefits.
North Korea is already a de facto nuclear power
For Tehran, alongside security calculations and the will to acquire influence in the region, the nuclear program was perceived as enforcing the right to decide what level of defense capabilities the country can have and as a means toward the scientific and technological advancement of the country.
Moreover, Obama gave concessions to Tehran that the U.S. has never granted Pyongyang: official talks with Tehran without preconditions and permitting the country to maintain its nuclear program intact, without dismantling any of the existing centrifuges or facilities.
Two elements are central in looking at the Iranian system and how it differs from the DPRK: the intra-factional dynamics (Iran has political currents based on shifting alliances between important political figures, centers of power and key constituencies) and the peculiar role of the Supreme Leader, whose ultimate goal is the survival of the system.
The deal was possible, largely, because of consensus across the country’s elite on the issue.
Obama gave concessions to Tehran that the U.S. has never granted Pyongyang
One sub-faction of the “principalist” group, the “traditional conservatives” (in contrast to the hardline conservatives) sided with the reformist Rouhani on nuclear diplomacy, as did the Revolutionary Guards and, above all, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.
All these actors perceived that the costs of opposing the deal were too high and that stopping it would jeopardize the existence of the system.
These convoluted and diffuse power structures are not present in the North Korean system, nor do domestic opinion or popular pressure have any impact on the foreign policy calculus of the regime.
On the contrary, the repressive nature of the Kim regime, and its capacity to impose costs on its population, make North Korea is a difficult target for sanctions, as noted by Haggard and Noland.
These differences also explain why sanctions have worked in the Iranian case but not against the North Korean leadership, whose political support base (the party, the military and the security apparatus) is largely unaffected by sanctions.
Finally, sanctions against Iran have been strictly implemented, while Obama could not count on Beijing against Pyongyang.
BROTHERS IN ARMS
Iran and North Korea were the dominant focus of President Obama’s nonproliferation policy. Moreover, leaked U.S. diplomatic cables from 2010 showed that U.S. officials believe Iran has acquired ballistic missile parts from North Korea.
The international community has known since 2002 that Pyongyang and Teheran have cooperated on missiles, as the resemblance between Iran’s Shahab-3 and the DPRK’s Nodong missiles makes clear.
Diffuse power structures are not present in the North Korean system
There have been a lot of unconfirmed reports about the missile and nuclear program collaboration between the two states, as well of Iranian missile experts stationed at a facility in North Korea near the Chinese border.
The truth is that it’s hard to know, precisely, what kind of cooperation is going on between the North Koreans and the Iranians.
What is certain, however, is that the two actors have a long-term partnership dating back to the 1980s, when an isolated Iran badly needed to acquire military hardware from Pyongyang in order to face Saddam Hussein during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war. In turn, Kim Il Sung badly needed hard currency.
Iran has acquired ballistic missile parts from North Korea
The Islamic Republic has also relied on North Korean scientists for help with its nuclear program, and Pyongyang is known to have assisted in fortifying a number of Iranian nuclear facilities against possible preemptive strikes.
It has also reportedlydispatched hundreds of nuclear experts to work with the Iranians, as well as providing Tehran with key nuclear software.
The most recent significative development in cooperation is a Scientific Cooperation Agreement that the two countries signed on the fringe of a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in Tehran in September 2012.
Both country’s official news agencies, KCNA and IRNA, reported that the agreement covered “cooperation in science, technology and education,” while Western sources reported that the parties also exchanged a secret two-page document that provides for the permanent stationing of an Iranian mission in North Korea.
Since the 2015 nuclear deal, ballistic missile development has been the most consistent area of Tehran-Pyongyang technological cooperation.
After the signing, Khamenei declared that the two countries had “common enemies.” In 2014-2016 cooperation waned as Tehran went through the last steps in the negotiation with P5+1 about the JCPOA.
President Rouhani, too, was focused on guiding his country on a different path, aimed at economic development and the reintegration of the country into the international community.
But the two actors still work together and, since the 2015 nuclear deal, ballistic missile development has been the most consistent area of Tehran-Pyongyang technological cooperation.
The similarities between the missiles tested by Pyongyang in the last few months and Iran’s technology suggests Tehran is contributing to North Korea’s nuclear buildup.
Moreover, the Islamic Republic has strategic interests in cooperating with the DPRK in this field: improved naval capabilities with sophisticated ballistic missiles enhance Tehran’s deterrent power toward the U.S., both in terms of creating high costs for a military confrontation with Washington and in Iran’s ability to threaten U.S. ships in the Straits of Hormuz.
And should Iran obtain a 2500-mile strike range, its capability to military threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. will increase considerably.
These considerations may be worth noting when looking at Tehran’s long standing goal to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East and at the current uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA, recently described by President Trump as “the worst deal ever.”
Maria Rosaria Coduti is a columnist for NK News. She is a Blue Book Trainee at the European Commission, EEAS department, and a Ph.D. Candidate at the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield. She received both a BA and MA, with honors, at the School of Political Science of the University of Bologna. She has previously worked as Non-Resident Junior Research Fellow at ISDP and has written on North Korea for the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, North Korean Review Online and the Korea Economic Institute blog. During her last MA year, Ms. Coduti conducted research on North Korea’s foreign policy. Her research interests focus on domestic and foreign policy of the two Koreas and China, inter-Korean relations, nuclear and security issues in Northeast Asia, and cognitive foreign policy analysis and role theory.