In a recent interview with the AP, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong made an offer that Pyongyang also made in January 2015. Although we do not have the full text of the interview, the offer was stated in clear and concise terms in the AP reporting: “stop the nuclear war exercises in the Korean Peninsula, then we should also cease our nuclear tests.” The timing of Ri’s remarks – as the exercises are already coming to a conclusion – makes its precise nature somewhat unclear. But the interview suggests that the exercises would have to be stopped “for some period, for some years.”

This detail aside, it was highly unlikely that the U.S. will take up this offer, and both American and South Korean officials quickly dismissed Ri’s remarks. Yet it is also worth stepping back to consider the wider strategic game that is in play in the wake of the fourth test and the initiation of new multilateral sanctions under UNSC Resolution 2270. Given that North Korea is not going to disarm unilaterally, is there any path back to the Six-Party Talks?

There are several reasons why American rejection of the offer was predictable; some political, some strategic. First, the offer has a blackmail structure: The implication is not only “cancel exercises and we will stop testing” but “fail to cancel exercises and we will continue to test.” Moreover, it was made in the context of ongoing missile developments that are clearly designed to enhance North Korean leverage. To engage on such terms is clearly a political non-starter for any sitting American president, and particularly a Democrat in the middle of a contested election season.

To engage on such terms is clearly a political non-starter for any sitting American president

Second, and more importantly, the offer does not address the central riddle of the day: whether North Korea has any interest in actually negotiating the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program. A freeze on nuclear testing offers very little insight on this question; it doesn’t even go as far as the failed Leap Day Deal of 2012. That agreement included a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests and nuclear activities at Yongbyon, including explicitly all enrichment activities. The DPRK also agreed to the return of IAEA inspectors to verify and monitor the moratorium and confirm that the 5-MW reactor and associated facilities were at least temporarily shut down.

Third, and more tactically, the offer is being made during an interim period when the international community – and not just the U.S. – is waiting to see whether China will fully implement UNSC Resolution 2270 and make a concerted effort to get North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. Why should the U.S. move in advance of greater clarity with respect to sanctions that even China felt necessary to impose given North Korea’s unwillingness to engage? And why should the U.S. respond to an offer that does not even meet Chinese objectives of signaling an interest in returning to the nuclear talks?

Yet even if a non-starter, the offer raises a larger question of whether there are conditions under which a North Korean – or Chinese – offer might be taken up. China has made it abundantly clear that its objective in signing on to UNSC 2270 was not simply punitive. What would it take for such negotiations to resume?

NO CREDIBILITY

To date, the United States, South Korea and Japan have demanded that North Korea show some signal of intent before negotiations could start. These preconditions are typically believed to be similar to the actions outlined in the Leap Day Deal. The U.S. and its allies have also made clear that the U.S. would not put anything material on the table prior to the onset of the talks. Kerry’s remarks at Hiroshima restated many of the prospective benefits outlined in the 2005 joint statement, including economic assistance, but these would only be granted incrementally as quid-pro-quos for discrete dismantlement steps, as was the case during 2007-08.

But the most likely question to arise in coming months is how the U.S. would respond to an offer to combine nuclear and peace regime negotiations.

Although Ri made no mention of a peace regime, the idea of negotiating such an agreement prior to denuclearization talks has been the heart of the North Korean approach to deflecting pressure away from its own weapons programs.

The American position has been that while the negotiation of a peace regime is a commitment that the U.S. made in the 2005 joint statement, such a negotiation would happen both after conclusion of a denuclearization agreement and at a separate forum. But if the North Koreans signaled a willingness to discuss denuclearization, is there any reason why the U.S. should continue to demur?

In the context of those negotiations, it could make sense to offer some moderation of exercises as well

My conclusion is “no.” If North Korea were to recommit to the joint statement of 2005 and thus firmly and publicly commit to negotiations over its nuclear weapons program, then the U.S. should consider a widening of the agenda to a discussion of peace regime proposals. There is some indication that these may involve as little as a restatement of no hostile intent, such as those contained in the Leap Day Deal. In the context of those negotiations, it could make sense to offer some moderation of exercises as well. If we were willing to enlarge the scope of the exercises in response to North Korean threats, why not at least moderate them back to trend in the context of negotiations that involved North Korean quid-pro-quos?

However, the deeper problem is not just one of American quid-pro-quos. The problem is that North Korea has to date been unwilling to support China’s trial balloon of linking the two negotiations. The belief that the U.S. holds the key to a peaceful path forward on the peninsula is one that North Koreans have been intent on emphasizing. But ultimately, it is up to Pyongyang to make the strategic leap that it can be more secure by foregoing its nuclear weapons program. Since the collapse of the Leap Day Deal, the third nuclear test of 2013, the rollout of the Byungjin line, the fourth test and ongoing missile developments, we have seen very little interest in making such a leap. Ironically for both Pyongyang and Beijing, the failure to even hint at a willingness to negotiate over nuclear weapons relieves the U.S. from difficult choices and shifts the onus for progress back to North Korea.