  
Analysis North Korea in January 2020: a month in review and what’s aheadNK Pro has conducted an in-depth analytic review of news on the peninsula for the period between January 1 and 31 
In addition to an Executive Summary providing top-line findings, the following review includes detailed analysis on a wide range of other specialist focus areas. Furthermore, it also includes a look ahead at the five events likely to create news in February. Please send any feedback about this feature to [email protected].  EXECUTIVE SUMMARYHUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: MAJOR ANTI-VIRUS MEASURES INTRODUCED Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll As the final ten days of January ticked by, the DPRK introduced a series of increasingly extreme measures to combat the Chinese novel coronavirus and ensure it is prevented from entering the country. Starting with a suspension of tourism only, but ending on January 31 with the cancellation of flights to many airports in Russia and China, the measures introduce drastic quarantine measures for any foreigners arriving in the country for the weeks ahead, at least. With the procedures sparking memories of North Korea’s excessive response to the much more far-flung Ebola crisis between 2014-2015, the neighboring epicenter of the novel coronavirus threat suggests there is a risk that many of the new measures could be in place for an even longer amount of time. RISK: The North Korean government’s expansive efforts to prevent novel coronavirus from entering DPRK territory illustrates how grave a threat the epidemic could pose the nation’s dilapidated healthcare infrastructure. Though the measures may prove instrumental in preventing the virus from spreading into DPRK territory, they are likely to come at some significant costs to the North. This is due to the practical halt of all tourism, business and humanitarian-related visitors entering the country for weeks if not months ahead. WMD: KIM BOASTS OF NEW MISSILE CAPABILITIES, BUT IMAGERY INCONCLUSIVE SURROUNDING POSSIBLE TEST PREPARATIONS Section by Chad O’Carroll The key WMD-related developments of January related to Kim Jong Un’s remarks about emerging missile capabilities and indicators of a forthcoming military parade. Following an extraordinary four-day plenum in late December, Kim said on January 1 that recent missile-related advances meant that “the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.” Furthermore, satellite imagery analysis by NK Pro revealed that the country may be preparing to hold a military parade in the coming weeks, as soldier formations which have in recent years only been visible prior to similar events appeared at a parade training ground in Pyongyang in the last few days. However, novel coronavirus fears may mean it is canceled or abandoned in February, at least. RISK: Kim’s remarks about the “new strategic weapon” will be of concern for many working on DPRK issues. Given the two reported rocket engine tests conducted in December 2019 – described as being part of efforts to bolster “the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent” – it thus appears likely that the North has plans to test advanced missile technology when Kim refers to a “new strategic weapon.” With the North having stated after the single test-firing of its liquid-fuelled Hwasong-15 ICBM that it had completed its “state nuclear force,” any further testing would thus involve new technology – such as a solid-fuelled engine – or focus on unequivocally demonstrating re-entry capabilities. LEADERSHIP: KEY PERSONNEL SHUFFLES COME TO LIGHT AFTER PARTY PLENUM Section by Minyoung Rachel Lee Kim started off the new year with his annual New Year visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, accompanied by the party leadership. Neither the party daily nor Pyongyang television carried photos of the visit, which was highly unusual. The leader made his first on-site guidance visit of the year at the construction site of Sunchon Phosphate Fertilizer Plant. Kim also visited the bier of his grandfather’s comrade-in-arms, Hwang Sun Hui, with his wife and party Central Committee (CC) vice-chairmen. In the meantime, the party plenum conducted sweeping personnel shuffles: approximately one-third of party department directors were replaced, and five party vice-chairmen were replaced. FOREIGN RELATIONS: AMID FOREIGN POLICY SHUFFLE, KIM JONG UN REVEALS NEW DIPLOMATIC DIRECTION Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll After Kim Jong Un’s December 31 deadline passed, North Korean authorities revealed a raft of changes that will have major consequences in the realm of foreign relations. Firstly, the DPRK’s new strategic direction was revealed on January 1, constituting a sharp jolt away from the spirit of the June 2018 Singapore joint declaration. Secondly, personnel changes in January suggested a state deprioritization of relations with the U.S. and possible downgrade of the general importance of the DPRK’s foreign ministry. And though U.S. statements throughout January suggest Washington hopes to pick up diplomacy again, the prospect of joint military exercises with the ROK are likely to further unsettle Pyongyang in Spring. Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll In January, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two companies for violating sanctions by employing DPRK workers abroad, while a U.S. grand jury formally indicted Virgil Griffith for his lecture at a cryptocurrency conference in Pyongyang last spring. Meanwhile, Cambodia ordered 16 North Korean computer programmers to leave the country, while Egypt and Russia offered mixed claims about compliance with the DPRK overseas worker ban. Section by Chad O’Carroll Signals emerged in January which suggested that the U.S. and ROK will continue to minimize military drills and exercises during Spring, in order to try and prevent an escalation of tension with North Korea. Simultaneously, however, analysis of DPRK state media in 2019 and January 2020 suggested that Pyongyang is continuing to increase its focus on military affairs. In the Czech Republic, it also notably emerged that the DPRK was trying to acquire conventional military components through an illicit network. ECONOMY: KIM JONG UN TELLS KOREANS TO TIGHTEN THEIR BELTS, DPRK EXPECTING INCREASED TOURISM Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll DPRK state media in January released a speech by Kim Jong Un at the Workers’ Party Plenum which gave policy pronouncements for 2020 and provided some insight into the future of the North’s economy. In addition, construction projects at airports, talk of new flight routes between China and the DPRK, as well as the official opening of Yangdok Hot Springs pointed to preparations to meet growing tourism demands. INTER-KOREAN: SOUTH RENEWS CALL FOR DIALOGUE AND PLANS TO SEEK SANCTIONS WAIVERS, WHILE NORTH GIVES COLD SHOULDER Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll January continued to see the two Koreas moving in contrasting directions. The South Korean administration attempted to move closer to Pyongyang by announcing renewed efforts to seek sanctions exemptions and waivers and that it will investigate “independent” South Korean tourism to the North. But DPRK leader Kim Jong Un omitted inter-Korean relations from his post-Plenum policy speech and rejected their attempts to mediate U.S.-DPRK talks.  HUMAN SECURITY / HUMAN RIGHTS: MAJOR ANTI-VIRUS MEASURES INTRODUCED, ROK ON DEFECTOR ISSUES BACKFOOT, HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS PROVIDED Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll As the final ten days of January ticked by, the DPRK introduced a series of increasingly extreme measures to combat the Chinese novel coronavirus and ensure it is prevented from entering the country. With the procedures sparking memories of North Korea’s excessive response to the much more far-flung Ebola crisis between 2014-2015, the neighboring location of the novel coronavirus threat suggests there is a risk that many of the new measures could be in place for an even longer amount of time. Meanwhile, on the human rights front, South Korea was caught on the backfoot for a perceived decline in assistance towards defectors. Yet in January, South Korea donated nearly $6 million in assistance to the DPRK, with Switzerland and Germany making smaller donations, too. Significant anti-virus measures introduced throughout the DPRK – As concerns relating to China’s response to the novel coronavirus grew in early January, NK News learned by the 21st of the month that tourism to North Korea would be suspended by authorities in order to prevent viral transmission into DPRK territory. In the subsequent days, it emerged that:
The rapidly expanding nature of measures imposed to contain the virus and prevent an epidemic in the DPRK suggests there could be long-term consequences for a wide variety of actors both inside and outside of the DPRK. South Korea on backfoot for perceived defector-related changes – January saw three sets of developments which saw Seoul on the backfoot for perceptions surrounding lapses in its treatment towards defectors. In its World Report 2020 released on January 14, Human Rights Watch (HRW) repeated that the DPRK constitutes “one of the most repressive countries in the world.” The report cited human rights abuses including restricted freedom of movement, class discrimination, intolerance for dissent and forced labor and detention. But the report also called on South Korea to “reprioritize” human rights both inside North Korea and domestically. While China was named as the most influential actor concerning Pyongyang, the report said that Seoul and Washington’s failure to discuss human rights issues in meetings with Pyongyang has allowed the problem to persist. The same day, John Sifton, HRW’s Asia advocacy director said “President Moon needs to abandon his flawed North Korea policy… [as the] North Korean government is never going to improve its human rights record unless the world demands it, and South Korea needs to lead the rallying cry for that to happen.” Meanwhile, a group of North Korean defectors held in Vietnam from November was released in January, according to Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. Though news of ROK government involvement in their release was absent at the outset, two differing narratives carried by the outlets suggested either European organizations or U.S. officials had been responsible for their release. As a result, Seoul received criticism from some for not acting more swiftly to secure the release of the detainees, all of whom would have been eligible for South Korean passports under the ROK constitution. Finally, an updated report by the ROK Ministry of Unification said the number of North Koreans that migrated to the South reached the lowest figures on record since 2001. Overall, the data showed a continued downward trend since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2011, an issue some say is related to how the Moon government treats incoming North Koreans. Seoul donated $5.73 million to DPRK programs, MSF and Swiss NGO granted UN exemptions – South Korea donated $5.73 million in January to UN agencies for humanitarian assistance to repair typhoon-hit facilities and improve healthcare in North Korea, according to Korea Times reporting on the 14. Of the nearly $6 million, Seoul provided $4 million to the World Health Organization and $1.7 million to the DPRK’s Red Cross Society. Also in January, Switzerland donated $1.35 million to the DPRK and Germany gave $672,000. Meanwhile, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Swiss Humanitarian Aid were both granted sanctions exemptions from the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) 1718 Committee for aid projects in North Korea, according to the committee’s webpage on January 7. Swiss Humanitarian Aid will be able to bring in materials designed to improve access to clean drinking water in rural areas, while MSF is approved to bring in materials for projects to fight tuberculosis. WHY IT MATTERS Government – The North Korean government’s expansive efforts to prevent novel coronavirus from entering DPRK territory illustrates how grave a threat the epidemic could pose the nation’s dilapidated healthcare infrastructure. Though the measures may prove instrumental in preventing the virus from spreading into DPRK territory, they are likely to come at some significant costs to the North. Firstly, NK Pro already understands that a range of humanitarian programming conducted by visiting NGOs has been abandoned until the end of April, at least, with possibilities of extension should the virus continue spreading in neighboring PRC. As a result, inbound humanitarian supplies are likely to be constrained as the number of visitors sharply decreases in the weeks and months ahead. In addition, NGOs which are permanently operating in-country could observe a shrinkage of staff over the coming months in the event staff are unwilling to engage in the lengthy quarantine procedures mandated on any return travel back to North Korea. In tandem, these developments will likely add further strain to the DPRK’s moribund public healthcare sector. Secondly, there will also be significant broader impacts on the DPRK economy should the January-mandated ban on inbound tourism prevail. As one of the key areas which had not been subject to UNSC sanctions, large numbers of Chinese tourists had become a vital ingredient of DPRK revenues last year. Furthermore, January saw South Korea assertively talk-up the prospect of independent tours from the ROK to the DPRK via third countries, despite U.S. concerns about sanctions. As a result, should visits be suspended for the long-term, the effects could mean two major sources of tourist numbers will be constrained, with impacts likely to be felt among entrepreneurs in the state tourism industry and at the macro national level, too. Finally, it is unclear how the new measures are impacting general cargo deliveries into DPRK land and seaports. Presumably, there may be some exemption for cargo haulers and foreign crew members to temporarily drop off inventory in (and out of) the country. If not, however, then this is another area that could have significant impacts on the DPRK economy should the anti-virus measures sustain to the medium and longer-term. Business – North Korea’s efforts to prevent an epidemic of novel coronavirus have already reached significant levels within an extremely short term. In comparison to measures taken against Ebola between 2014-2015, they are already more significant and far-reaching in nature. And given the novel coronavirus hails from China, instead of far away on African shores, it appears more likely that the new measures could remain in place for significant time. As a result, this health crisis could have the potential to cause significant and potentially even long-term impacts on the DPRK economy. In particular, there are several concerns for those in the business community. With all foreigner access to the country effectively suspended due to the new travel restrictions and widespread cancellation of flights, tourism to the North is likely to be significantly impacted over the coming months. As a key cash cow between 2018-2019 for authorities in the DPRK, this could have a noticeable impact on the North Korean economy if it prevails into high-season events like the April marathon and anniversaries surrounding Kim Il Sung’s birthday. Beyond potentially risking the short-term viability of firms specializing in travel to North Korea like Koryo Tours, Uri Tours, and Juche Tours, the measures will also prevent the much larger and more lucrative Chinese tourist market from coming for a sustained period of time. This could naturally significantly dampen prospects for the scheduled April grand opening of the Wonsan Kalma tourist resort, as well as the recently opened Yangdok spa resort. Furthermore, if the trend continues in the months ahead, these measures could lead to the large-scale abandonment or full cancellation of important business events like the Pyongyang International Trade Fair. They could also impact important maintenance for UNSC-authorized joint ventures (J/Vs) like the Egyptian-backed Koryolink cell phone network, as well as prevent visits by the scores of unauthorized Chinese-DPRK (J/Vs) currently thought to be active in the country. And another area likely to be impacted will be journalism in the DPRK, with foreign bureaus such as AFP, AP, Kyodo, Tass, and Xinhua likely to be prevented from sending foreign staff in and out of the country in the weeks and months to come.  WMD: KIM BOASTS OF NEW MISSILE CAPABILITIES, BUT IMAGERY INCONCLUSIVE SURROUNDING POSSIBLE TEST PREPARATIONS Section by Chad O’Carroll The key WMD-related developments of January related to Kim Jong Un’s remarks about emerging missile capabilities, indicators of a forthcoming military parade, as well as satellite imagery which suggested few preparations for tests or launches were on the immediate cards. Kim Jong Un boasts of “ultra-modern” and “strategic” weapons – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said the series of 15 missile-related test events in 2019 – combined with achievements by DPRK national defense scientists – helped the country develop an “ultra-modern weapon” and “possession of promising strategic weapon system.” Addressing the Workers’ Party Plenum in comments published on January 1, Kim said that in “clarif[ying] the policy of the WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea) towards the U.S… we should more actively push forward the project for developing strategic weapons.” He “confirmed that the world will witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.” Kim also used the remarks – provided in lieu of a traditional new year’s speech – to call on the munitions industry to tap into the “spirit and mettle with which they developed the nuclear war deterrent [during the] three-year arduous struggle,” allegedly completed in early 2018. In order to counter U.S. “provocative political, military and economic maneuvers to completely strangle and stifle the DPRK,” Kim said the country “will shift to a shocking actual action to make it pay for the pains sustained by our people so far and for the development so far restrained.” U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said later in January that the DPRK was “clearly” trying to build a long-range, nuclear-capable missile. “They have an aggressive R&D program and a test program, to say the least, and we monitor it very carefully and very closely.” Possibility of forthcoming military parade, though may be abandoned due to novel coronavirus – North Korea may be preparing to hold a military parade in the coming weeks, satellite imagery dated January 22 indicated, as soldier formations which have in recent years only been visible prior to similar events appeared at a parade training ground in Pyongyang in the last few days. The scale of any potential parade in the coming weeks is still yet to be determined from available imagery, though the occasion could serve as an opportunity for North Korea to show off the “new strategic weapon” promised “in the near future” by leader Kim Jong Un at December’s plenum. “A parade would be an opportune moment to fete last year’s remarkably successful missile-testing campaign, which concluded with 25 out of 26 launched projectiles succeeding (a single KN-25 multiple launch rocket system projectile is thought to have failed during the September 11 test),” NK Pro analyst Ankit Panda said on January 27. However, the possibility of a parade to coincide with one of either two major forthcoming February anniversaries in the DPRK could be diminished by growing precautions surrounding containment efforts related to novel coronavirus. On January 31, a DPRK foreign ministry note sent to diplomats said that “during the month of February, events, ceremonial visits and meetings shall not proceed, and essential meetings shall be conducted via telephone.” It is thus possible the precaution could preclude any military parade taking place soon. Imagery reveals little activity at key DPRK nuclear, missile sites – During January, satellite imagery analysis at 38 North indicated that there was little activity at key sites related to DPRK nuclear and missile programs:
WHY IT MATTERS Government – Of priority concern for governments focusing on DPRK denuclearization matters will be Kim Jong Un’s January remarks that the world will “witness a new strategic weapon to be possessed by the DPRK in the near future.” Given the two reported rocket engine tests conducted in December – described as being part of efforts to bolster “the reliable strategic nuclear deterrent” – it thus appears likely that the North has plans to test advanced missile technology when Kim refers to a “new strategic weapon.” And in this context, Kim’s statement warning that Pyongyang will “shift to a shocking actual action” to make the U.S. pay for “the … development so far restrained,” it’s plausible that Kim is hinting further intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests are being considered. With the North having stated after the single test-firing of its liquid-fuelled Hwasong-15 ICBM that it had completed its “state nuclear force,” any further testing would thus involve new technology – such as a solid-fuelled engine – or might focus on unequivocally demonstrating re-entry capabilities. Even if actual testing might not take place for the short to medium-term, it’s possible that new prototypes of emerging solid-fuel ICBMs could be revealed at forthcoming DPRK military parades. And if satellite imagery indicators surrounding the possibility of a parade in February or April prove accurate, observers should keep a close eye out for North Korea using the occasion to parade possible new prototypes. These could, in turn, provide clear indicators about what could be on the horizon for future ICBM tests. Business – Indicators gathered throughout January suggest there is a low probability of any destabilizing long-range projectile or nuclear testing by North Korea in the short-term. Despite heightened anxieties in December surrounding the prospect of a “Christmas gift,” it appears North Korea is currently prioritizing state efforts in combating the novel coronavirus. Thus, while there were indicators surrounding the possibility of a military parade as early as February – which could be used to show-off new missile capabilities – these may now be reversed by a public health order seen by NK News to cancel all forthcoming “events, ceremonial visits and meetings.” Overall, it appears Pyongyang continues to prioritize development of the WMD sector and there should thus be concern surrounding Kim Jong Un’s statements about the future prospect of a “new strategic weapon.” But for now, it appears more consequential issues capable of impacting stability for businesses in the region are unlikely to rear their heads until later in the year.  LEADERSHIP: KEY PERSONNEL SHUFFLES COME TO LIGHT AFTER PARTY PLENUM Section by Minyoung Rachel Lee Kim Jong Un made three appearances between January 1 and 24, four less than his seven public activities during the same period in the previous month and one less than his four appearances during January 1 and 24, 2019. Kim started off the new year with his annual New Year visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, accompanied by the party leadership. Neither the party daily nor Pyongyang television carried photos of the visit, which was highly unusual. The leader made his first on-site guidance visit of the year at the construction site of Sunchon Phosphate Fertilizer Plant. Kim also visited the bier of his grandfather’s comrade-in-arms, Hwang Sun Hui, with his wife and party Central Committee (CC) vice chairmen. In the meantime, the party plenum conducted sweeping personnel shuffles: approximately one-third of party department directors were replaced, and five party vice chairmen were replaced. Although the party plenum readout did not provide the names of those who were dismissed or recalled, the post-party plenum photo carried on January 1, and the list of the state funeral committee for Hwang Sun Hui on January 18, provided a clearer insight into who lost their key party titles. Leadership rostrum shots and state funeral committee lists usually are reliable sources for piecing together the North Korean leadership hierarchy. Foreign policy team shuffles — Like in 2016, North Korea replaced the party International Department head and foreign minister simultaneously. Ri Su Yong lost his titles as party Political Bureau (PB) member, party CC vice chairman, and party International Department director during the party plenum. He was replaced by Kim Hyong Jun, former DPRK ambassador to Russia and Middle East countries, as party vice chairman and International Department director. Foreign minister Ri Yong Ho was replaced by Ri Son Gwon, former chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), almost certainly during the party plenum. Ri Yong Ho appears to have lost his PB member title as well. Both Kim Hyong Jun and Ri Son Gwon are lightweights compared to their immediate predecessors. Notably, Ri has little to no diplomatic and foreign policy experience. New Minister of People’s Armed Forces — North Korea promoted Kim Jong Gwan, formerly vice minister of People’s Armed Forces in charge of major construction projects, to minister of people’s armed forces. This indicates the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) will play a more prominent role in national economic projects. It also seems to suggest a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities between the MPAF and the Korean People’s Army (KPA). These changes may have been discussed at the Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting held in the lead-up to the party plenum. Kim Yo Jong’s status — Kim Yo Jong’s case is curious for two reasons. She appeared to have lost her PB alternate member title after the Hanoi summit, but her profile rose after Xi’s visit to Pyongyang, even suggesting that she may have regained her PB alternate member title. The group photo taken after the party plenum, however, showed Kim standing at the end of the second row, with party department officials, away from the cluster of PB alternate members, suggesting she may not have been reinstated to the PB. Also, many South Korean media outlets speculated that Kim had transitioned from first vice director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) to first vice director of the more powerful Organization and Guidance (OGD). However, Kim was named third out of four officials appointed as first vice department directors. OGD officials are typically listed first. Hence, Kim Yo Jong’s OGD appointment remains questionable. WHY IT MATTERS Government –- The changes to the foreign policy team raises questions about Kim Jong Un’s policy priorities, especially U.S. policy in the bigger framework of DPRK foreign policy; the foreign ministry’s status in North Korea; and future dynamics between the International Department and the foreign ministry. After Hanoi, Kim empowered the foreign ministry to take the lead in DPRK-U.S. nuclear negotiations, transferring the role from Kim Yong Chol, who was North Korea’s chief negotiator with the U.S., to the ministry. This role may now be transferred to another entity, for example the party International Department. The changes in the foreign policy team leadership, coupled with a lack of any authoritative state media commentaries since late October 2019 and North Korea’s unusual silence on high-level US officials’ comments since late December, all suggest that Pyongyang may roll out a clearer-cut U.S. policy in the coming months, perhaps near the time of showcasing the “new strategic weapon” Kim Jong Un mentioned in his plenum speech. Business –- The economy remains a top priority, despite Kim Jong Un’s stated intent to continue strategic weapons development. This is also supported by the appointment of Kim Jong Gwan, who has been in charge of the military’s contributions to national economic projects, as the head of the MPAF. Kim in his speech at the party plenum expressed concern about a lack of economic order and criticized the cabinet for lax control. His plenum speech and subsequent state media reporting indicate that North Korea will maintain reform-oriented measures, but it will seek to increase control over individual economic units to ensure they keep within the boundaries of the law. There is no cause for major concern for now, but state media should be tracked closely in the coming months for possible signs of change in Kim’s reform-oriented policy, particularly given Kim’s use of “belt-tightening” in his plenum speech. “Belt-tightening” is a euphemism for sacrificing the civilian sector to build up national defense.  FOREIGN RELATIONS: AMID FOREIGN POLICY SHUFFLE, KIM JONG UN REVEALS NEW DIPLOMATIC DIRECTION Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll After Kim Jong Un’s December 31 deadline passed, North Korean authorities revealed a raft of changes that will have major consequences in the realm of foreign relations. Firstly, the DPRK’s new strategic direction was revealed on January 1, constituting a sharp jolt away from the spirit of the June 2018 Singapore joint declaration. Secondly, personnel changes in January suggested a state deprioritization of relations with the U.S. and possible general downgrade of the general importance of the DPRK’s foreign ministry. And though U.S. statements throughout January suggest Washington hopes to pick up diplomacy again, the prospect of joint exercises with the ROK are likely to further unsettle Pyongyang in Spring. Deadline for diplomatic progress expires, new strategic direction revealed – On January 1, Kim Jong Un’s self-declared deadline for diplomatic progress with the U.S. expired and details surrounding an unprecedented four-day DPRK plenum event were revealed. Above all, the contents of the plenum outcome constituted a sharp jolt away from the spirit and early momentum of the June 2018 Singapore joint declaration. Beyond expressing no clear interest in denuclearization at the plenum, Kim Jong Un warned it could “never” happen “if the U.S. persists in its hostile policy”. Under such circumstances, he said North Korea would instead “steadily develop necessary and prerequisite strategic weapons.” However, it was unclear if Kim’s April 2018 moratorium on nuclear and ICBM testing had been officially rescinded, with his remarks on the topic appearing to make such a change contingent on specific and ongoing American actions. Further fueling sentiment that Kim aimed to leave a window of opportunity open to the U.S. were remarks that:
It was likewise notable that Kim’s plenum remarks neither went as far as articulating any formal suspension of diplomacy with Washington. Also, there was no notable disparaging of U.S. President Trump, suggesting Kim continues to remain open to the possibility of working with him in the future. Overall, though, the new strategic vision contained in Kim’s post-plenum remarks will not be cause for optimism among U.S. policy-makers working on the DPRK denuclearization portfolio. North Korean ambassadors recalled amid major foreign ministry shakeup – North Korean ambassadors from postings which NK Pro understands included Angola, China, Germany, Sweden, the UN, and others were spotted returning home to Pyongyang on January 18. It appeared their return was likely linked to major DPRK foreign ministry news which NK News exclusively broke just a day later: that veteran foreign minister Ri Yong Ho had been replaced by Ri Son Gwon, the former chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country (CPRC). Ri Son Gwon, who played a prominent role in inter-Korean talks in early 2018, also previously served as an official at the Policy Department of the now-defunct National Defence Commission (NDC). It is thought his appointment will portend a harder line on DPRK foreign affairs. In this regard, Ri on January 23 promised that the country would aim to “confront and overpower” the hostile powers’ policy of sanctions and pressure against it, in a speech to foreign diplomats obtained exclusively by NK News. In another important change, North Korea named Kim Hyong Jun, the country’s former ambassador to Russia, as head of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea’s (WPK) influential International Department, a note circulated to diplomats in Pyongyang seen by NK News confirmed on January 22. He replaced Ri Su Yong, who just days before NK News anticipated had been demoted or retired from his position as a member of the Politburo and vice chairman at the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in charge of international affairs. U.S. officials remain optimistic, in state of ongoing outreach – U.S. officials remained mostly positive in their outlook throughout the month of January, despite Kim Jong Un’s stated pivot away from diplomacy. Developments of note throughout January included:
WHY IT MATTERS Government – The new direction, revealed by Kim Jong Un after the four-day extraordinary plenum, will be of deep concern to anyone hoping for a breakthrough to get over the ever-worsening post-Hanoi diplomatic impasse. Furthermore, the subsequent foreign ministry reshuffles and recall of ambassadors imply that relations with the U.S. may have now been strategically downgraded, with the importance of the ministry itself possibly relegated, too. Yet the DPRK position which emerged at the plenum was far from the worst-case scenario of a formal suspension of talks and/or announcement of a clear intention to openly resume ICBM and nuclear tests. Furthermore, the absence of rhetoric directly criticizing President Trump – as well as prompt acknowledgment of his birthday card to Kim – suggests Pyongyang is still interested in what he might be able to do in future. From the U.S. perspective, the patient and relatively accommodating rhetoric seen throughout January suggests that Washington is now in a form of “wait-and-see” mode. Though U.S.-driven sanctions designations and articulations of diplomatic pressure will likely articulate in the months ahead, recent rhetoric suggests they will likely only continue at “maintenance” levels to avoid further destabilizing things with Pyongyang. In other words, it seems the U.S. may also hope to kick the can down the road and look at reinvigorating diplomatic efforts either when the DPRK is ready or when Trump’s political future is clearer. A large scale risk prevails, however. Kim Jong Un’s plenum remarks will in the short-term make it much harder for Washington to ignore or downplay events such as short-range missile tests or extensive DPRK military drills in the way it did in the second half of 2019. That could mean a heightened risk of escalation cycles quickly emerging, especially when reduced-scale U.S.-ROK military exercises likely resume in March. Business – Developments in January suggest limbo surrounding the extremes of DPRK diplomacy and threat will prevail in the short term, with implications for a wide range of business stakeholders. This is because there appear to be low chances for either a diplomatic breakthrough or a major increase in tensions in the short-to-medium term. Firms anticipating future economic cooperation with the North will be disappointed by the plenum outcome and personnel rearrangements in the DPRK foreign ministry, none of which suggest an opportunity-creating DPRK-U.S. diplomatic outcome is on the cards any time soon. Similarly, companies that benefit from heightened security threats on the peninsula – military providers, risk analysis firms, evacuation logistics providers, etc – are also unlikely to have opportunities emanating from a major return to tensions in the short-to-medium term. But while friction between the DPRK and U.S. will likely continue at low-levels throughout February – which will benefit firms who thrive on stability on the peninsula – there’s a risk that tensions could re-emerge in spring. That’s because though regular-scale annual ROK-U.S. drills are unlikely, smaller replacement exercises are likely to begin in March that could provide Pyongyang with justification to conduct missile activities that destabilize the peninsula. Depending on the scale of the ROK-U.S. exercises, simultaneous DPRK missile activities, and subsequent American responses, tensions could rise relatively quickly.  SANCTIONS: U.S. TREASURY DESIGNATES TWO ENTITIES, RUSSIA AND EGYPT CLAIM SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll In January, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two companies for violating sanctions by employing DPRK workers abroad, while a U.S. grand jury formally indicted Virgil Griffith for his lecture at a cryptocurrency conference in Pyongyang last spring. Meanwhile, Cambodia ordered 16 North Korean computer programmers to leave the country, while Egypt and Russia offered mixed claims about compliance with the DPRK overseas worker ban. U.S. Treasury blacklists two entities, American indicted for blockchain lecture – The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned one North Korean and another Chinese company for violating U.S. sanctions that prohibit the employment of DPRK citizens abroad, it announced on the 14th of the month. The press release alleged that Pyongyang’s Korea Namgang Trading Corporation and Beijing Sukbakso facilitated the logistics for North Korean workers to maintain jobs in Russia, Nigeria and multiple countries in the Middle East and Asia, as well as returning the funds back to the DPRK. UNSC sanctions currently prohibit DPRK laborers from earning money abroad, as it is suspected to contribute to the country’s finance of nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Any assets of the two companies in U.S. territory will now be blocked and any person that does business with the two companies could also be subjected to designations. Meanwhile, on January 7, a U.S. grand jury formally indicted Virgil Griffith, an American blockchain researcher arrested in November over a lecture he gave at a cryptocurrency conference in North Korea last April. The court indictment revealed that Griffith has been accused of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and for illegally providing services to the DPRK government and violating U.S. sanctions against the country. The maximum sentence for these violations is 20 years in prison. Griffith pleaded innocent to the charges on January 30, NK News reporting later revealed. Russia and Egypt in mixed compliance with UN sanctions – Nearly all of the 11,490 North Koreans reported to have been working in Russia were repatriated in compliance with UN sanctions, said Pyotr Ilyichev, the head of Russian foreign ministry’s Department of International Organizations said on January 15. Those North Korean citizens whose contracts expired before December and no longer receive income either departed the country already or will as flights become available, in compliance with UNSC Resolution 2397, he said. Roughly 1,000 North Korean workers remained in Russia as of late January, Moscow later conceded, blaming poor transport infrastructure for the delays. Russia insisted on January 30 that their ongoing presence did not constitute a sanctions breach. Whatever was actually going on, December data showed a ten-fold increase in Russia’s issuance of student and tourism visas for DPRK citizens in the second half of 2019, indicating Russia may have simply switched visa types for numerous North Korean workers. Meanwhile, Egypt also claimed full compliance with sanctions, reporting to the UN that all North Korean workers had been repatriated by the December 22 deadline. While Egypt has not been known to host large numbers of North Korean workers, a 2017 White House readout on a phone call between President Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi said that “Trump stressed the need for all countries to fully implement U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea, stop hosting North Korean guest workers, and stop providing economic or military benefits to North Korea.” Further, Egypt is known for its military, telecommunications and economic ties to North Korea. Cambodia ordered 16 DPRK citizens to leave the country – Cambodia arrested and ordered 16 North Korean computer programmers to leave the country on January 3 who were found to be working illegally in the country, Cambodia’s immigration authorities said. The DPRK citizens were said to have entered the country on tourist visas but were employed by a Chinese online gambling company without a work permit in the city of Siem Reap. The city’s immigration police chief added that UN sanctions on North Korea restricted DPRK citizens from conducting business in UN member countries, and “as a UN member, we are bound to follow the world body’s decision.” The decision is noteworthy as it follows the UN’s December 22 deadline for repatriating DPRK workers, a new Cambodian law that bans online gambling and North Korea’s reputation for increasing IT capabilities, particularly relating to hacking and cyber-crime activities. WHY IT MATTERS Government – January’s OFAC sanctions on two entities responsible for employing North Koreans abroad are the latest effort by the Trump administration since March 2019 to slowly but steadily increase sanctions related to the DPRK. In 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department passed only four sets of sanctions related to North Korea, with the January 2020 blacklisting of the two entities/persons representing the fifth action. It also comes four months after the previous designation and nearly two months after the Department of Justice’s arrest of Virgil Griffith. This contrasts with the department’s 2018 measures which designated companies or individuals on 11 occasions. While sanctions enforcement slowed significantly in 2019, it appears as though the U.S. is currently focusing on steadily taking actions on a sanctions maintenance basis. While this is likely to constitute only a tiny fraction of the targets under active Treasury monitoring, the ongoing drip of sanctions maintenance designations will likely continue to draw negative attention from North Korean counterparts. Meanwhile, governments invested in UNSC sanctions enforcement will likely continue to scrutinize the movement of North Koreans in Russia and Egypt, as well as economic exchanges between the two. While both countries appear eager to be compliant with UNSC sanctions, evidence suggests there may be more to the story. In addition to Russia’s sharp increase in tourism and educational visas provided to DPRK citizens, an August 2019 PoE report said North Korea’s efforts to send technicians to establish “a complete supply chain” was “ongoing” in Egypt, based on information received from an unspecified country. Further, NK News also recently revealed that Orascom financed a massive new light wall system comprising over 100,000 LEDs installed on Pyongyang’s Ryugyong Hotel in 2018, suggesting economic cooperation between the firm and its DPRK partners could be exceeding the bounds of any UNSC exemptions. Business – As diplomacy has effectively broken down between the DPRK and U.S., it is probable that Washington will coordinate with European and Canadian partners in the short-to-medium term to ensure that sanctions pressure is not seen to diminish. As a result, further unilateral designations from the U.S. are likely to continue emerging in the months ahead, resembling sanctions maintenance, while it is probable that the U.S. will push hard at the UN to include significant sanctions evasion evidence in the forthcoming Panel of Experts report (scheduled to be published around March). Together, these phenomena bode poorly for companies willing to risk existing sanctions and engage in business with the DPRK, as NK Pro knows is happening with a wide range of mostly Chinese, Russian, African, and SE Asian actors. At the same time, it is probable that due to U.S. interest in resuming diplomacy with North Korea and anxiety about enticing Pyongyang into major testing of new weapons technologies, both Treasury and State will hold back on major sanctions pursuit in the short to medium term. Consequently, though risks for companies flouting sanctions will rise in 2020, they will be far from the full scope given current geopolitical circumstances.  MILITARY: U.S.-ROK SPRING DRILLS LIKELY TO BE DOWNSCALED, BUT DPRK FOCUS ON MILITARY CONTINUES TO INCREASE Section by Chad O’Carroll Signals emerged in January which suggested that the U.S. and ROK will continue to minimize military drills and exercises during Spring, in order to try and prevent an escalation of tension with North Korea. Simultaneously, however, analysis of DPRK state media in 2019 and January 2020 suggested that Pyongyang is continuing to increase its focus on military affairs. In the Czech Republic, it also notably emerged that the DPRK was trying to acquire conventional military components through an illicit network. U.S. and ROK likely to host spring exercises on adjusted basis The U.S. and South Korea will likely continue to host military exercises in an adjusted manner in order to support denuclearization diplomacy, unnamed military sources told the ROK’s main news agency on January 22. “If diplomatic efforts are underway, we will conduct [the drills] within the bounds to be agreed upon between the South and the United States,” translated senior official remarks carried by Yonhap News Agency said. As happened last year, the two countries are therefore expected to replace traditional Key Resolve and Foal Eagle drills with a computer-simulated command post exercises known as Dong Maeng. So far, there has been no official confirmation of the news from either the U.S. or South Korea. But it is unclear if further adjusted exercises will placate North Korea, which has complained regularly about the downscaled scope of USFK training since the Singapore summit — as recently as on January 1. This may be because in 2019, the two countries conducted more than 100 battalion-level drills and exercises, according to ROK Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo on January 15. In contrast, North Korea claims that Trump promised to scrap all of them. Militaristic focus emerges in 2019, early 2020 state media – NK Pro analysis of state media-derived data saw a rise in prominence of several top military and munitions industry officials across 2019. The NK Pro leadership tracker revealed a notable rise in military-related appearances by the North Korean leader, often by a number of major military and munitions industry officials – many of whom received promotions during last month’s ruling party plenum. Most notable among these were Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff chief Pak Jong Chon and Ri Pyong Chol, who appeared at 13 events alongside the North Korean leader in 2019. Ri, who previously served as a first vice director at the Munitions Industry Department, appeared only three times in 2018. Meanwhile, satellite imagery analyzed by NK Pro on January 23 revealed that North Korea might be in the midst of preparations for a military parade, potentially scheduled for later in February or April this year. And potentially giving insight into DPRK military complaints that are likely to come, on January 27 state media complained about ROK defense authorities spending “huge amounts of money” on securing more advanced weapons — a common refrain in 2020. Czech gov’t foiled North Korean arms smuggling plot, intelligence service says The Czech intelligence services foiled a North Korean attempt to smuggle arms through the country, the country’s Security Information Service (BIS) and local media reports indicated in late January. In a plot reportedly uncovered in 2012 and 2013 and uncovered by Slovakian outlet Deník N, a North Korean diplomat working as an economic attaché in Germany contacted a local businessman asking for help acquiring parts for T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored cars, and jet planes. That diplomat — said to be working on behalf of the DPRK’s security services, highers-up at the North Korean embassy, and officials from the DPRK’s top arms companies — is also said to have hoped to acquire drones capable of carrying recording equipment. Pyongyang had allegedly planned to smuggle the illicit materiel through Africa and China, in a move that would constitute a clear violation of an arms embargo imposed on the DPRK in 2006. WHY IT MATTERS Government – Throughout 2019, North Korea was deeply critical of military training exercises conducted by South Korea and the U.S., as well as American deliveries of advanced weapons systems such as the F35A stealth fighter jet to the ROK air force. The DPRK’s own tests of emerging solid-fuel missile systems such as the KN-23 and KN-25 were often timed to follow actions related to South Korea’s own military preparedness. As a result, while the current indicators suggest that the two allies will likely try and significantly reduce the scope of expected Spring drills, it is probable that North Korea will still describe whatever happens as evidence of Washington and Seoul’s “hostile policy”. Consequently, it is likely that the forthcoming spring season of training programs will be used by the DPRK as justification for its own military developments. These could include artillery drills in areas which should be limited due to the 2018 Pyongyang military agreement with Seoul, or possibly further short or medium-range missile tests. Business – Those in the business community who benefit from stability on the peninsula should take note of indicators relating to forthcoming friction points in the military domain. North Korea’s militarization trends are increasingly clear in analysis of its state media, which means a muted response to reduced-scale U.S.-ROK exercises in Spring would be highly unlikely. Depending on how much friction is ultimately created, however, business opportunities could eventually emerge for vendors in the defense sector. This is because a strident DPRK response to Spring activities could, in turn, lead the U.S. to rethink its approach to seasonal drill restraint. And in the event the U.S. were to push South Korea to once again adopt major annual drills, a plethora of defense sector business opportunities would be likely to emerge given the scale of the exercises.  ECONOMY: KIM JONG UN TELLS KOREANS TO TIGHTEN THEIR BELTS, DPRK EXPECTING INCREASED TOURISM Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll DPRK state media in January released a speech by Kim Jong Un at the Workers’ Party Plenum which gave policy pronouncements for 2020 and provided some insight into the future of the North’s economy. In addition, construction projects at airports, talk of new flight routes between China and the DPRK, as well as the official opening of Yangdok Hot Springs pointed to preparations to meet growing tourism demands. Kim Jong Un warns of belt-tightening, but talks of bumper harvest – DPRK leader Kim Jong Un’s speech on the final day of the Workers’ Party Plenum on December 31 had at least two key messages about the North Korean economy past and present. Firstly, Kim Jong Un warned citizens to be prepared to “tighten our belts” and correct “insufficient” domestic economic management as sanctions relief is not expected soon. His remarks indicate that Pyongyang does not expect to reach an agreement in U.S. – DPRK talks anytime soon, thus the country will need to work more efficiently in order to spur the domestic economy under existing sanctions. Secondly, the Korean-language version cited Kim as saying the country had the “best harvest on record.” But while there are signs the harvest may have improved, it is unlikely to be the “best harvest on record,” according to DPRK economy experts Peter Ward and Benjamin Silberstein. Signs of increasing tourism? – Multiple developments during the month of January point to preparations to meet a growing tourism demand, which will mostly be Chinese if trends during 2018-2019 are anything to go by:
Key indicators show improving economy in 2019, while DPRK indicators continue to be stable – The biggest news of January was that China’s trade with North Korea — imports and exports alike — grew in 2019 compared to 2018, according to new government data released at the end of the month by the Chinese General Administration of Customs. According to Beijing’s own data, Pyongyang imported $2.5 billion worth of goods from the country in 2019, up from $2.2 billion in 2018. At the same time, the North exported $215 million worth of goods to China last year, compared to $213 million the year before. One expert told NK Pro that the new numbers are “notable” — not only because they show trade between North Korea and China has increased over the last year, but also because China is admitting it. In addition, a report released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on January 16 estimated that North Korea’s gross domestic product grew 1.8 percent percent last year, KBS reported. But experts cautioned against such estimates as Pyongyang does not release official economic data. Further, it followed a report in December by Statistics Korea which estimated the DPRK economy shrank by 4.1 percent. Inside North Korea, Daily NK and NK Pro pricing and exchange rate data from December to January showed some relatively sharp increases in pork and gas pricing. On currencies, data from the two sources showed primarily stable official and unofficial exchange rates, with a slight but temporary uptick in the unofficial euro exchange rate.
WHY IT MATTERS Government – Developments and trends from January will be of some concern to policy-makers, for a variety of reasons. Firstly, that two separate sets of data suggested increasing economic performance by the DPRK in 2019 will come as a cause for concern to policy-makers hoping for sanctions pressure to make Pyongyang return to diplomacy any time soon. That Pyongyang was able to increase – even modestly – its trade with China raises serious questions about how it is paying for imports from companies in PRC amid such significant global sanctions. And that one set of indicators suggest the DPRK economy actually improved in 2019 is for similar reasons surprising. Secondly, though there was much skepticism about Kim Jong Un’s claim of a “bumper harvest” in 2019, it is possible that the data was not as bad as had been originally predicted. What’s most likely is that the supply situation is not quite so bad as the North Koreans originally claimed in early 2019, but they are also receiving some assistance from neighbors, namely China. This could also have implications for pressure which sanctions architects may hope to increase in the year ahead. But while the DPRK appears to have taken numerous steps in January to profit from further tourism spikes in 2020, the potential economic benefits might be severely constrained by ongoing novel coronavirus preparations. As mentioned in the humanitarian/human rights section above, should these strict travel measures remain implemented for the medium to longer term, they could have a significant negative impact on North Korea’s economic outlook for 2020. Business – North Korea’s preparations in January for increasing tourism flows, seemingly for the most part from China, indicate that Pyongyang continues to receive assurances from Beijing that it will continue to encourage large numbers of PRC tour groups to visit in future. While Chinese and North Korean tour agencies and businesses will remain the primary beneficiaries until other significant players like South Korea can get involved in the market, the novel coronavirus precautions mentioned elsewhere in this report are likely to cause a significant short-term loss of revenue for key stakeholders in this field. If and when those measures are relieved, another important consequence to bear in mind is that the ongoing growth of DPRK-PRC tourism ties mean that North Korea’s economy risks becoming extremely dependent on Chinese acquiescence in this area in the medium to long term. Given the huge resources that Pyongyang appears to be plowing into developing the tourism sector, this could have both geopolitical and business-level consequences for both sides, depending on the future direction of bilateral ties.  INTER-KOREAN: SOUTH RENEWS CALL FOR DIALOGUE AND PLANS TO SEEK SANCTIONS WAIVERS, WHILE NORTH GIVES COLD SHOULDER Section by Caroline Kearney and Chad O’Carroll January continued to see the two Koreas moving in contrasting directions. The South Korean administration attempted to move closer to Pyongyang by announcing renewed efforts to seek sanctions exemptions and waivers and that it will investigate “independent” South Korean tourism to the North. But DPRK leader Kim Jong Un omitted inter-Korean relations from his post-Plenum policy speech and rejected their attempts to mediate U.S.-DPRK talks. North and South remain at odds in New Years Address and official statements – South Korea was only mentioned once — and indirectly — in North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s speech at the Worker’s Party Plenum, according to a DPRK state media report released on January 1. Instead of positively responding to Pyongyang’s moratorium on nuclear and missile tests, Kim Jong Un complained that the U.S. conducted “joint military drills” with South Korea and shipped “ultra-modern warfare equipment” there. In contrast, Kim’s 2019 speech on New Year’s day praised inter-Korean progress, and in 2018, Kim called for “face-to-face” discussions with Seoul. Then, on January 16, the ROK government revealed that the DPRK government sent another notice in late December which demanded that Seoul remove South Korean-built facilities at the now-shuttered Mt. Kumgang tourist resort by February 2020, according to Yonhap News. ROK President Moon Jae-in New Year’s Address on January 7, in contrast, reiterated his government’s willingness to meet the North Korean leader and vowed to “continue efforts” to resume operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourism resort. He called on Pyongyang to work with Seoul to find “realistic” ways to resume cooperation, namely through the possibility of jointly hosting the 2032 Olympics and other sports-related exchanges, connecting roads and railways along the inter-Korean border, and in the tourism domain. But North Korea did not appear impressed by Moon’s speech. When South Korea took credit on January 8 for passing a personal birthday greeting from U.S. President Trump to leader Kim Jong Un, a top DPRK foreign ministry advisor on January 11 said Trump had already sent a “personal letter” to Kim and told Seoul that its mediation efforts were not necessary as a “special liaison channel” between the two leaders already existed. NK Pro understands that the DPRK statement refers to the so-called “New York Channel.” Seoul to explore partial sanctions waivers and lifting domestic law for tourism to the North – The Moon Jae-in administration indicated its intention to seek partial international sanctions waivers and exceptions for inter-Korean projects as well as temporarily amending ROK domestic law to allow “independent” South Korean tourism to the North. In an annual press conference on January 14, President Moon said that Seoul would explore options to renew inter-Korean relations “a little more independently” going forward, and cited tourism as well as cross-border and sports-related exchanges as opportunities not prohibited by UNSC sanctions. He also said his administration may seek partial international sanctions waivers and exceptions for inter-Korean projects in response to North Korea’s purported steps towards denuclearization. And Seoul’s unification ministry spokesperson on January 17 implied that South Korea may temporarily waive its own laws to allow South Korean tourists to visit the North. But in response to a question raised by NK News about the developments on January 16, U.S. Ambassador Harry Harris acknowledged that while “tourism is allowed under sanctions,” it would face numerous logistical hurdles created by sanctions, and it should therefore be first discussed in the U.S.-Korea working group. Following major controversy in South Korea about the Ambassador’s remarks, the following day a Blue House official described his remarks as “very inappropriate.” Yet the Blue House official added that the South would “always” consult with the U.S. on North Korean issues. Inter-Korean activities impacted by DPRK novel coronavirus fears – North Korea decided to postpone plans to demolish South Korean-owned facilities at the Mount Kumgang resort, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification (MOU) said on January 30, due to concerns about visiting ROK officials posing novel coronavirus transmission risks to the DPRK. A day prior, the MOU revealed that it would be temporarily suspending activities at the jointly-run liaison office at Kaesong as a separate precautionary step. “The South and the North have decided to maintain the liaison work of the inter-Korean joint liaison office through opening special telephone and fax hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang,” an MOU spokesperson said. The development followed ROK officials trying to visit the facility being turned away at the border just a day before. WHY IT MATTERS Government – The sole and indirect mention of South Korea in Kim Jong Un’s annual policy speech – as well as the Moon administration’s response to it – highlights the troublesome status of inter-Korean relations in at least three ways. Firstly, the contrast demonstrated that inter-Korean relations continue to hinge on progress in U.S. – DPRK talks, as Pyongyang again made explicit that its negotiations with Washington continue to take priority. Though South Korea may be able to win back a seat at the table if it is able to successfully carve out inter-Korean opportunities outside of sanctions, the prospects for this remain dim due to the DPRK’s ongoing public disinterest in the role of Seoul. Secondly, the fact Kim Jong Un made the decision to ignore South Korea and President Moon in his Plenum speech – instead of defaming them – suggests that improvement in inter-Korean relations in 2020 may nevertheless be possible if Seoul meets Pyongyang’s demands for substantial economic exchanges. However, the fact the exchanges sought most by Pyongyang would require large changes to the UNSC sanctions regime makes improved relations unlikely. Lastly, the Moon administration’s renewed push for sanctions exemptions and waivers and recent announcement that the country is considering “independent tourism” indicates that Seoul is getting increasingly frustrated by the fact that inter-Korean relations are so closely linked to the poor state of DPRK-U.S. denuclearization talks. Aware that the opportunity to improve relations with Pyongyang is rapidly shrinking, President Moon’s administration may pursue increasingly radical and risky initiatives in the remainder of its term to kickstart inter-Korean relations. The risk, of course, is that this could see relations with the U.S. further sour. Business – January saw significant talk about the prospects of “independent” South Korean tours to North Korea, with the most likely practical method likely to be through a third country such as China or Russia. But while travel industry experts told NK News that should the DPRK approve a change in regulations to facilitate such visitors, it appears highly unlikely that North Korean authorities would welcome ROK tourists through the vectors currently acceptable for Western and Chinese tourists. This is because unlike the tour facilities at Mount Kumgang and Kaesong, such a vector would mean widespread potential interaction with DPRK nationals, something that North Korean state security and propaganda ministries have long sought to avoid. As a result, even if the ROK were to make necessary changes to national law, it appears highly unlikely that North Korean authorities would be willing to risk such ideological dangers by allowing South Koreans to visit on such tours. Overall, the timing of Seoul’s proposals — amid significant measures designed to prevent novel coronavirus from entering the DPRK — is also poor, with no prospect for any tourism whatsoever for at least several months more.  DPRK STATE MEDIA: NEW AND NOTABLE In this section, NK Pro highlights a number of noteworthy DPRK state media stories from the month of January: Rallies held nationwide to raise awareness of DPRK leader’s Plenum speech – North Korean state media said on January 5 that rallies had taken cross across the country for citizens to pledge to fulfill Kim Jong Un’s post-Plenum speech remarks. Rodong Sinmun reveals domestic drug abuse and smuggling problems – A photo in a January 16 Rodong Sinmun article revealed the issues of “drug use” and “smuggling” as examples of “reactionary ideas and culture,” NK Pro analyst Rachel Minyoung Lee observed. Home-made passenger vehicles on the increase in Pyongyang – The Pyongyang Times said on January 29 that in recent years more than 100 new-style “trolley-buses and many tramcars have been produced in a serial way.” New coronavirus infection rapidly spreads over the world – The Pyongyang Times on January 26 revealed that the Chinese state commission of hygiene and health had reported that a new type of coronavirus rapidly spread over 29 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) of China. Kim Jong Un sends greetings to foreign leaders – KCNA on January 2 said that DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un had sent new year’s greetings to leaders from countries including Kuwait, Palestine, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Egypt.  MONTH AHEAD: WHAT TO EXPECT Section by Chad O’Carroll Looking ahead at the month of February, the following confirmed and speculative events may lead headlines and news on North Korea. U.S.-ROK Working Group to meet in Seoul – NK Pro understands that Deputy Assistant Secretary for North Korea Alex Wong will visit Seoul in February with a delegation of U.S. officials for a new session of the U.S.-ROK Working Group. The body, which is designed to coordinate DPRK cooperation and sanctions-related issues, is likely to spend time reviewing recent public friction on the issue of “independent” South Korean tourism to the North — as well as possible ways forward on inter-Korean cooperation and denuclearization diplomacy. UN Panel of Experts draft to be submitted by February 7 – The United Nations Panel of Experts (PoE) on DPRK is mandated to submit a draft of its final report to the 1718 Committee for review by no later than February 7. But NK Pro understands that there is a heightened risk of delay, this year, due to unprecedented disagreement about the contents among some of the P5 countries’ panel members. Details could soon emerge in the news cycle, as a result. Halt of meetings, events due to novel coronavirus containment effort – DPRK authorities revealed towards the end of January that efforts to contain novel coronavirus would mean a suspension of “events, ceremonial visits, and meetings” until the end of February, at least. Distributed to foreign diplomats and resident intl’ organization staffers, it’s unclear if the halt will also expand to include nationally-focused DPRK calendar events. Events in February will reveal soon if this is the case, with the potential that a military parade possibly scheduled for February 8 could be delayed. Kim Jong Il’s birthday on February 16 – North Korea will celebrate former DPRK leader Kim Jong Il’s official birthday, also known as the “Day of the Shining Star,” on February 16. As one of the country’s most celebrated holidays, the country typically sees mass dances, art performances, a fireworks show in central Pyongyang, and a visit by current leader Kim Jong Un to the Kumsusan mausoleum. Though some of these might be canceled due to coronavirus containment efforts, the holiday will likely feature prominently in state media. State of Union, multiple Presidential debates – Throughout February numerous events on the U.S. political calendar will emerge that have a high probability of touching upon the North Korea news cycle. The following dates list key events:
 Edited by James Fretwell and Oliver Hotham © Korea Risk Group. All rights reserved.
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September 19, 2026Sep 19, 2026
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