North Korea’s imminent Ninth Party Congress is poised to serve as a key inflection point for the regime, 15 years into Kim Jong Un’s rule.

The Korean People’s Army can boast of significant progress on modernization goals since the last congress in 2021, developing capabilities ranging from tactical nuclear warheads and solid-fuel missiles to new submarines.

The DPRK has also reaped benefits thanks to Russia’s transformation from a marginalized player on the peninsula to a treaty ally, placing Kim in a stronger position on the global stage despite some friction with China.

A look back at the last five years shows that not everything has gone according to plan, however: North Korea has faced persistent economic challenges, including a food crisis, and the influx of outside information presents an existential threat to the Workers’ Party’s ideological control.

Under these circumstances, NK Pro analysis suggests that the Ninth Congress will focus on consolidating gains toward existing military goals rather than prioritizing new weapons development, while recalibrating economic plans around qualitative targets that make it easier to claim victory. 

But big questions remain around the potential for diplomacy with the U.S., redefining the inter-Korean border and leadership succession — all of which could increase the risk of conflict on the peninsula and beyond in the years to come.

THE 2021 SCORECARD

Military: Significant progress across an array of systems

After the 2021 Congress, a 12-item weapons wishlist emerged that analysts initially dismissed as aspirational. 

Five years later, NK Pro analysis showed significant progress across the majority of systems. These include tactical warheads, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, a tactical nuclear attack submarine, reconnaissance satellite, hypersonic vehicles and underwater drones.

Some critical gaps remain, however. State media released photos of the nuclear-powered submarine, but it remains far from deployment. “Super-large” warheads received no updates over the last five years, and progress on a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) remained unclear until late 2024. 

In short, the overall record supports a genuine modernization achievement rather than propaganda theater, and there have been many conventional reveals as well. 

Economy: Major development, but rhetoric often exceeded reality

Kim Jong Un’s drive to increase self-reliance produced several notable outcomes: new factories under the 20×10 regional development program, construction at military-industrial complexes and consumer goods exhibitions.

The problem is that construction doesn’t prove increased production capacity or an ability to substitute for imports. U.N. and ROK assessments through 2024 continued reporting significant food insecurity and medical supply shortages, though some disagreed with these claims.

Agricultural performance was uneven. Increased spending on farming and evidence of improved harvests due to favorable growing conditions were positive developments, but neither pointed to structural reform. Instead, the regime reasserted central farm control.

Construction delivered major progress on physical structures — Hwasong Street, the Komdok mining town and tens of thousands of new rural homes. North Korea appears likely to achieve its 50,000 Pyongyang homes target before the 2026 Congress.

However, missed deadlines likely reflected frequent materials shortages, while quality problems indicate the regime prioritized unit counts over habitability. 

Kim Jong Un also candidly criticized the state’s performance on flattening regional disparities at the end of 2024, noting failures to build up regional industry, poor planning and inadequate support for farmers, housing and other basic needs. Similar comments in Dec. 2025 highlighted the wealth gap between Pyongyang and the rest of the country.

Foreign relations: Russia up, strained China ties

The 2021 Party Congress sought “special” relations with China and noted improvements in ties with Russia since the 2016 Party Congress, while offering few details about new goals.

What has materialized in the years since has been a dramatic strategic alignment that saw wishy-washy Russia ties transform into a “comprehensive strategic partnership” due to North Korea’s support for the war against Ukraine. High-profile leader summits, weapons transfers to Russia and the deployment of DPRK soldiers to the conflict represented a major breakthrough that wasn’t forecast in 2021.

All of this appeared to have a cost for China ties. The 75th anniversary of DPRK-China relations passed with muted ceremony and fewer leader messages in 2024. Trade fell in early-to-mid 2024 as Pyongyang’s alignment with Moscow created visible Beijing discomfort. 

The relationship recovered modestly in 2025, with Kim participating in a Victory Day summit in Beijing, renewed delegation activity and a trade rebound. But North Korea has hardly made good on its pledge of “tactical cooperation.”

Meanwhile, the Eighth Party Congress designated the U.S. as the “biggest, main enemy” obstructing DPRK development and declared that American policy “never changes,” regardless of who holds the White House. The regime proved it meant this: Pyongyang has shunned engagement with Washington, not only under Joe Biden but also since Donald Trump’s return to office in Jan. 2025.

As for South Korea, the 2021 Congress left open the possibility of restoring cooperation if Seoul ceased “hostile acts.” But the reality is that North Korea shut the door over the last five years, even dropping reunification as an official state goal.

Politics and society: Heightened controls, health modernization, political

North Korea made significant progress on Kim Jong Un’s order to “thoroughly eliminate non-socialist elements.” This included adoption of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture, cracking down on the use of South Korean expressions and words and strengthening the work of “non-socialist groups” that enforce ideological conformity.

Public health modernization finally made progress after years of delays with the opening of the Pyongyang General Hospital last year, as well as regional hospital launches (Kangdong, Ryonggang, Kusong). Education initiatives provided some tangible deliverables like new uniform supply, even as school renovations stalled.

The Eighth Party Congress outlined plans for party institutionalization through procedural changes. The meeting codified the five-year congress cycle and empowered the Presidium, streamlining decision-making authority. But little is known about how the Workers’ Party of Korea has otherwise transformed its operations over the last five years.

On the financial side, North Korea’s central bank issued money coupons (dongpyo) in response to trade shocks from the pandemic, while broadening tax collection in a move that supported greater central control.

Overall performance

A look back at 2021-2025 shows that North Korea delivered on military modernization but only made cosmetic progress elsewhere. 

This gives the regime the option of claiming comprehensive victory, but Kim’s recent speeches suggest he’ll instead opt to repeat the 2021 pattern of candid criticism. 

The leader has repeatedly leaned on public criticism of regional development failures and poor planning to strengthen his legitimacy, demonstrating accountability while blaming external challenges (sanctions, the pandemic) and corrupt officials.

Kim is likely to modulate his message by sector. Military achievements will receive triumphalist coverage, capped by a parade after the congress. On the economy, the leader will boast of qualified progress while acknowledging unmet targets. 

Progragandists will emphasize progress on ideological control as essential to keep out ideological pollution from enemy nations like South Korea.

Foreign policy realignment presents the most sensitive messaging challenge and will likely receive vague treatment.

WHAT TO WATCH AT THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS

Military/WMD: Consolidation over new frontiers

The 2026-2031 plan will likely emphasize operational deployment of demonstrated systems rather than new capabilities. Expect goals centered on:

• Nuclear arsenal expansion — North Korea could seek to scale up production of tactical warheads, miniaturize warheads for multiple platforms and hit specific stockpile targets (though it is unlikely to reveal these). It could shift its framing from aspirational development to practical deterrence.
• Creating a satellite constellation — North Korea has placed one reconnaissance satellite in orbit, though its capabilities are likely highly limited. Over the next several years, the regime will likely look to launch another three to five satellites as part of efforts to build a satellite constellation capable of continuous coverage.
• Naval modernization — The nuclear-powered submarine will receive a revised timeline, acknowledging delays. Tactical nuclear attack submarines will become the practical focus, while production of modern combat vessels will feature prominently in plans to build a navy no longer focused just on coastal defense.
• Drone warfare — The Korean People’s Army could formalize a dedicated drone unit within its air force. This is technically feasible given growing domestic production capabilities, Russia cooperation and efforts to align with global trends. State media will publicize large-scale drone exercises as evidence of modernization.
• Missile modernization — Military planning will continue to emphasize precision-strike capabilities and missile launcher production. The DPRK made significant progress on these systems from 2021-2026, and they support deterrence and weapons export objectives.

What’s unlikely for the next five-year plan is the introduction of fundamentally new weapons categories. The 2021 wishlist covered the strategic spectrum, so the 2026 goals will likely focus on quantity, reliability and deployment, rather than novel capabilities.

Economy: Recalibrating targets

North Korea’s economic goals are likely to face the most significant adjustment. Given mixed progress on 2021 targets, the Ninth Party Congress could opt for more vague formulations allowing flexible interpretation of success.

• Agriculture — The congress will likely announce grain production targets and agricultural modernization goals, but this could pose problems if the targets assume favorable weather without addressing mechanization, fertilizer and fuel shortages, and poor incentives for farmers. The regime might opt for an alternative framing around food security, emphasizing storage, distribution, and diversifying diets, rather than raw tonnage.
• Civilian nuclear program — Pyongyang may unveil a civilian nuclear energy initiative, framing atomic power as key to sovereign development while leveraging Russian technical assistance. This could legitimize continued nuclear R&D under a developmental rather than military framing, promising brighter lights without committing to delivery.
• Construction — The regime will undoubtedly launch ambitious construction campaigns to replace aging housing stock and formalize rural housing targets. With flagship projects like Pyongyang General Hospital and Wonsan-Kalma complete, the congress is likely to reveal a new signature initiative, like renovating a major transportation corridor, large-scale tourism infrastructure or showcase development in a secondary city.
• Regional development — The 20×10 factory program will remain a key initiative for reducing regional disparities. Expect new provincial industrial capacity targets, potentially paired with infrastructure goals (electricity, rail, roads) enabling regional growth.
• Self-reliance 2.0 — Authorities will continue to emphasize domestic production, though they could downplay the goal of reducing import dependence (which is difficult to measure but likely failed). Instead, they could call for enhancing production quality or expanding the variety of consumer goods, qualitative goals that make it easier to claim victory by citing select examples.
• Technology — Sci-tech development remains a stated priority. Likely goals will cover AI, automation, digitalization and the “knowledge economy.”
• Tourism — This sector remains a major question. While the congress could announce a major expansion of tourism beyond friendly countries like Russia, it’s more likely that perceived security risks will lead North Korea to keep its door closed to most outsiders.

Foreign policy: Managing the new reality

Foreign policy goals will formalize the recent realignment with Russia, while attempting to manage its consequences.

• Russia — The congress will trumpet closer integration under the banner of “strategic coordination,” though it will keep the details vague to avoid alienating China further. Behind the scenes, North Korea could target increased trade, infrastructure connections (rail, energy), technology cooperation, and potentially formalization of labor exports.
• China — Recent developments make China the most delicate messaging challenge. The congress will likely make a modest attempt to repair ties without subordinating Russia. Key areas to watch include whether the congress outlines specific China cooperation projects (special economic zones, infrastructure like the New Yalu River Bridge) or only offers formulaic statements about “strengthening traditional friendship.”
• South Korea — Regime rhetoric will probably maintain the “principal enemy” designation for South Korea. A key issue is whether the DPRK spotlights changes to how it interprets the inter-Korean border, especially in the Yellow Sea, an issue that could create friction with the ROK.
• U.S. — North Korea will likely seek to preserve diplomatic space for discussions with the U.S. under Trump, offering conditional language about preparing for dialogue when Washington ends its “hostile policy.” This approach will allow the leadership to claim it never foreclosed engagement while taking no practical steps toward it.
• Sanctions adaptation — Rather than pursuing sanctions relief, the congress will call for improving self-sufficiency under permanent blockade and seek development opportunities under pressure. This rhetoric acknowledges the permanence of the sanctions regime without calling it surrender.
• Regional diplomacy — The congress could place renewed emphasis on Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos) and potentially Middle East/Africa partnerships that don’t depend on great power approval. These relationships offer possibilities for sanctions circumvention and support narratives about diplomatic normalization.

Internal goals: Control and legitimacy

North Korea will continue to place great emphasis on ideological control given the enormous threat posed by outside information and South Korean culture, calling for eliminating “non-socialist practices.”

The congress will present public health and education goals in a show of its commitment to improving people’s welfare. The ruling party will also stress “discipline” and “accountability,” code for eliminating corruption and improving performance.

A key area to watch will be whether the congress acknowledges market activity and private ownership (like recent change allowed car ownership), or intensified rhetoric emphasizing state control over the economy in line with recent trends.

Another big question remains whether the regime will announce new titles or roles will be declared for women close to Kim Jong Un, in particular his daughter Kim Ju Ae and sister Kim Yo Jong. There could be movement on formalizing his daughter’s suspected position as successor, though this likely won’t be a key topic of discussion even if she participates in the congress.

LOOKING AHEAD

The overarching message of the Ninth Party Congress will almost certainly be one of triumph, showcasing the extent of progress under Kim Jong Un’s leadership while blaming others (enemy states, self-serving officials) for occasional problems.

But what’s far more important to watch are the specific decisions and conditional language that the congress adopts, which will have major consequences for peninsula stability and beyond.

Any reinterpretation of Yellow Sea boundaries would create immediate flashpoints in contested waters, where prior skirmishes have brought the Koreas to the brink of war.

A formal designation of Kim’s daughter as successor — while highly unlikely for someone so young — could betray acute health concerns about the leader, introducing greater uncertainty into the domestic politics of a nuclear-armed state. 

Doubling down on drone warfare and expanding foreign troop deployments will further demonstrate that North Korea is not just an isolated regional problem, potentially extending its reach beyond the war in Ukraine.

As such, the congress will reveal whether Kim sees the next five years as a period to consolidate under constraints, or to embrace an aggressive strategic posture that poses bigger global risks.

Edited by Bryan Betts