Editors note: This is the fourth article in a five-part series featuring interviews with former members of the U.N. Panel of Experts. (Part 1 is here | Part 2 is here) | (Part 3 is here) | (Part 4 is here) | (Part 5 is here)

The U.N. Panel of Experts (PoE) on North Korea formed in June 2009, following Security Council Resolution 1874. With its first report published in May 2010, the PoE has now been producing reports for 10 years.

Most North Korea watchers would agree there is little chance of U.N. sanctions ever achieving DPRK disarmament, which would by default remove all need for the Panel’s existence.

However, the closure of a U.N. Panel of Experts focusing on Iran in 2015 does show that the existence of the DPRK PoE is not guaranteed forever.

So under what conditions would support for the PoE’s work dwindle — and at what point would experts be asked to find new jobs?

To find out answers to this and a lot more, NK Pro spoke to five former members of the Panel to gather their thoughts and analysis.

Experts for the interview series include*:

• John Everard – Former Coordinator of the UN’s DPRK Panel of Experts – UK
• Katsu Furukawa – Former expert of the UN’s DPRK Panel of Experts – Japan
• Martin Uden –Former Coordinator of the UN’s DPRK Panel of Experts – UK
• Neil Watts – Former expert of the UN’s DPRK Panel of Experts – South Africa
• Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt – Former expert of the UN’s DPRK Panel of Experts – United States

* Chinese and Russian former members of the Panel declined to take part in all interviews.

NK PRO: Under what circumstances – if any – do you think the UNSC consensus required to support the PoE’s ongoing work might disappear, absent the goal of DPRK denuclearization being realized?

These responses have been lightly edited and condensed for clarity and readability.

Martin Uden: It’s back to that phrase that I keep using: big power politics.

The DPRK – an important subject though it is in itself – is but one of many that the United States, Russia, China, and others have to be considering. And it’s very clear, there is often a payoff between the DPRK subject and others, including the China-U.S. trade issues, or sanctions on Russia regarding Crimea and Ukraine.

These things all have an impact on how countries appear to consider sanctions on the DPRK. It was very clear to me, for instance, that when sanctions – financial ones and U.N. ones – were being imposed on Russia regarding Ukraine, Russia then became much more reluctant to consider effective implementation of sanctions against the DPRK. So that’s the sort of thing that can happen.

It’s not at all difficult for China, or the United States for that matter, to use the DPRK as a pawn in other games.

If we do see a continuing breakdown of trust between particularly the U.S. and China, then that can easily play into, let’s say, the continuation of the Panel’s mandate or appointing Committee members and whatever else.

It’s not at all difficult for China, or the United States for that matter, to use the DPRK as a pawn in other games, so to speak. So that’s the risk I’m seeing, frankly.

Neil Watts: These circumstances I don’t think relate to the Panel’s work. I think these circumstances relate to the relations between the P5.

Right now, you’ve got two P5 members who feel that sanctions should be lifted or some of the sanctions, at least, should be lifted. However, their request was roundly rejected. So they might go ahead on the unilateral base anyway, by simply declining to enforce some violations or simply turning a blind eye to some of the economic activity.

In that way, they would in fact not be supporting the resolutions – rather than stopping support of the Panel of Experts.

These circumstances I don’t think relate to the Panel’s work [but rather] relations between the P5.

Supporting the Panel of Experts usually comes in the form of replies to the Panel’s inquiries. And I think in the last two and a half/three years, there has been a reduction in the amount of information that some of the P5 states have supported the Panel in terms of responding to their queries.

Katsu Furukawa: Well, when the U.S. government stops supporting the panel, then that’s the end of the panel.

This was the case with U.N. sanctions against Iran in 2015. I recall that after the Iran nuclear deal, when it was signed, the U.N. Panel on Iran sanctions was dissolved.

So when the U.S. government concludes an agreement with North Korea on denuclearization, then it might be possible that the Panel could be dissolved. Everything is entirely up to the decision of the U.S. government – instead of the Security Council when it comes to the North Korean sanctions.

When the U.S. government concludes an agreement with North Korea on denuclearization, then it might be possible that the Panel could be dissolved

Frankly, I’m personally concerned about President Trump. If he were able to close some agreement with North Korea, carelessly, North Korea – with the support of China and Russia – might push for dissolving the U.N. Panel, which is my concern.

John Everard: As far as I’m aware, nobody has articulated the kind of situation in which you would disband the Panel of Experts. Although, remember that it was only brought into being in the second round of sanctions on North Korea.

Resolution 1718 brought into being the 1718 Committee, hence the name. It was a subsequent resolution that brought into being the Panel of Experts. It wasn’t all done in one hit.

Logically, in U.N. terms, it means that were the DPRK to comply with the instructions by the Security Council in the second resolution, then there will be a strong case for disbanding the Panel of Experts. They have complied with the resolution so the committee measures no longer need apply. But I don’t think we’re anywhere near that point now.

In real political terms, of course, the risk is that at some point, China, or Russia, or both decide either they want to needle the U.S., or that they want to signal closer support to the DPRK and veto the annual renewal of the Panel’s mandate. And that, of course, remains a real risk.

Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt: It depends. Clearly, if the members of the Security Council determine that North Korea is coming into compliance with the resolutions, even if gradually, then they could make an argument [to stop supporting it]. But that’s not the case right now. So, I’m not sure under what circumstances they would withdraw support.

[With the Iran Panel], there was a political process underway and an agreement. Currently, I can’t comment on the probability or the possibility of that happening.

Edited by James Fretwell