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North Korea and the ROK–U.S. Security Alliance

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The Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance has encountered the most turbulent period in the history of the bilateral relationship. The apparent decline of the relationship worsened with the developing North Korean nuclear crisis after October 2002 and the election of new leadership in South Korea. Gaping differences are appearing over key issues, which adversely influence the bilateral relations. This article argues that there are two underlying reasons that have brought about these differences—identity crisis and deficiency in mutual understanding. Variations in state identity can affect the national security interests or polices of states, and Seoul and Washington have shown different identities, especially with respect to Pyongyang. While alliance is a moving target that needs continuous attention and adaptation, the two countries failed to catch up with each other’s changes. This article investigates and highlights the gaping alliance differences and proposes some remedial measures for a better future of the bilateral alliance.

Keywords: North Korea; DPRK; South Korea; ROK; United States; nuclear proliferation; security alliance

On March 2, 2003, four North Korean fighter jets—two MiG-29s and two MiG-23s—approached an American reconnaissance plane—an RC-135S Cobra Ball. The plane was carrying out a routine surveillance mission in international air space over the East Sea, 150 miles off the North Korean coast. The North Korean jets locked their attack radar onto the U.S. plane and tailed it for about twenty-two minutes, closing to within fifty feet at one point. This high-risk maneuver was the most serious military encounter between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in recent years.

Two days after the encounter, Republic of Korea (ROK) President Roh Moo Hyun said in an interview with The Times that the incident was predictable because the United States had increased its aerial surveillance of North Korea’s resumed nuclear activities. Of the U.S. monitoring activities, he observed that “a very strong threat against a counterpart can be a very effective means of negotiation.” President Roh further added that he was “urging the United States not to go too far.”

Mr. Lee Jongseok, formerly a member of the Foreign, Unification & Security Affairs for the Transitional Committee for the 16th President of the ROK and Minister of Unification, made a similar comment about the high-altitude encounter: “What North Korea did was nothing

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Triggered by candlelight demonstrations mourning two schoolgirls accidentally killed by a U.S. Army vehicle in the fall of 2002, the ROK–U.S. alliance has encountered the most turbulent period in the history of the bilateral relationship. The apparent decline of the relationship worsened with the developing North Korean nuclear crisis after October 2002 and the entrance of a new leadership in South Korea four months later. Gaping differences are appearing over key issues, adversely influencing relations between Seoul and Washington. South Korean reaction to the high-altitude interception incident may be a symptom of uncertainties on the road ahead in the bilateral relationship. At this juncture, a good grasp of the differences between the ROK and the United States on major issues is essential if a better and more solid bilateral relationship is to be forged.

A difference of opinion among allies is common. The ROK–U.S. alliance was formed in each nation’s interest, and it therefore follows that the national interest is given first priority. During the past half-a-century of alliance, there have been many vehement disagreements between the Republic of Korea and the United States. The differences recently revealed, however, are fundamentally different from previous ones in five key aspects. This article argues that there are two underlying reasons that have brought about these differences.

The first underlying reason is that the ROK and the United States are going through identity crises. The ROK-U.S. alliance has been forged and maintained against the aggressive nature of the leadership in Pyongyang and its physical military threat. That is, until recently, Seoul and Washington had a shared common view that the North Korean regime was the principal security threat on the Korean peninsula and countering it was the most important objective of the bilateral security alliance. There are signs that this common view appears to have changed on the part of South Korea. Having profound impacts on U.S. security perception and strategy, the 9/11 terror attack has also affected the U.S.–ROK security posture. As observed by John Lewis Gaddis, “September 11th was not just a national security crisis. It was a national identity crisis as well.”

In detail, South Korea and the United States have recently shown different identities with respect to North Korea. For example, in a poll for the Korea Institute for National Unification in 2005, 64.9% of those asked said they perceived North Korea as an object of cooperation or assistance while 31.1% regarded the North as an object of vigilance or enemy. In a similar survey in 1998, the figures were 37.2% and 54.4%, respectively. For a possibility of North Korean invasion, in 2005, 43% of the respondents answered the possibility to be very high or a little high, while 57% said the possibility is little or zero. For the same question, in 1998, the figures were 57.7% and 38.9%, respectively. As if to follow changing public opinion, the ROK stripped North Korea of the title “main enemy” in the 2004 Defense White Paper. In contrast, in a Gallop poll in 2005, North Korea was ranked as the second greatest enemy of America (18.21%), next to Iraq (22.12%) and before Iran (13.71%). In a similar poll in 2001,
North Korea took seventh rank (1.98%) after Iraq (38.39%), China (13.68%) and others.\textsuperscript{5} The Bush administration also defined North Korea as tyranny—“the combination of brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems”\textsuperscript{6}—and a potentially hostile state that could use its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) “against the United States or its allies preemptively, during conflict or to slow follow-on stabilization efforts.”\textsuperscript{7}

Identity can affect international relations in two ways.\textsuperscript{8} On the one hand, variation or changes in state identity can affect the national security interests or polices of states. On the other hand, configurations of state identity can affect interstate normative structures and regimes. There are three gaping alliance differences mainly because of the first category of identity crisis.\textsuperscript{9} The Kim Dae Jung administration’s “Sunshine Policy” and the Roh administration’s “Peace and Prosperity Policy” differentiated their perception and thus their identity on the North Korean regime from previous ROK administrations as well as the Bush administration. As a result, the ROK and the United States show clear differences in their attitudes toward the North Korean leadership. There are differences in the perceptions of the security threat posed by North Korea, especially the nuclear crisis. And, in consequence, there are differences in how to cope with and resolve this nuclear crisis.

The second underlying reason that has brought about current alliance differences is deficiency in mutual understanding. It may be surprising in that more than a million South Koreans live in the United States and more than 100,000 Americans live just in metropolitan Seoul and its vicinity. While alliance is a moving target that needs continuous attention and adaptation, the two countries, especially their political leaderships, have largely remained in the routine of the past. For instance, the United States failed to catch up with dynamic changes occurring in the South Korean society, while the ROK was not able to fully grasp the repercussions of the 9/11 terror and subsequent changes in the American thinking and policy making.

There exist two gaping alliance differences largely because of deficient mutual understanding. Anti-American sentiment among the South Korean public emerged to the fore and was amplified by the candlelight demonstration in late 2002. In response, anti-Korean emotions are emerging from some in the U.S. administration. At the same time, the restructure and redeployment of U.S. Forces in South Korea have accelerated, which makes many South Koreans concerned about their security. This article investigates and highlights the gaping bilateral differences and proposes some remedial measures for the better future of the ROK–U.S. bilateral alliance.

**Attitudes toward the North Korean Regime**

**South Korea**

The Sunshine Policy and the Peace and Prosperity Policy were based on the notion that the North Korean regime can be induced to change by providing unsparring assistance. The Sunshine Policy rests on the idea that North Korea’s threatening
posture arises from insecurity and regards the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles as the only path to security and survival.\textsuperscript{10} According to this logic, engagement can reduce this insecurity and end the proliferation threat, supposing that various carrots will persuade the North Korean leadership to give up the pursuit of dangerous new weapons. In fact, then-President Kim Dae Jung praised Kim Jong Il as a leader of good judgment in 2000,\textsuperscript{11} setting into the foundations of the Sunshine Policy a deliberate strategy to refrain from criticism of the North Korean leadership.

President Roh’s perception of the North Korean regime showed some variations after his visit to Washington in May 2003. For example, in a March 2003 interview, the president said “I want to stress that North Korea [is] opening up and that it is already changing. If we give them what they desperately want—regime security, normal treatment and economic assistance—they will be willing to give up their nuclear ambitions. We should not, therefore, treat them as criminals but as counterparts for dialogue.”\textsuperscript{12} In an interview during his visit to the United States, however, President Roh evaluated the North Korean leadership in a quite different tone. “I think North Korea is insisting on an obsolete regime and the values that it pursues are not in the interest of its people. And its behavior and its demands are not those that can be accepted by the international community. And I—so therefore I don’t think North Korea is a partner to be trusted, and I don’t agree with its regime.”\textsuperscript{13}

\section*{The United States}

For the United States, a deep-seated mistrust of the ruling regime underscores its perception of North Korea. Such distrust has resulted in demands for high levels of transparency and verification. For example, Secretary of State Powell pointed out that verification and monitoring regimes were missing in the Clinton administration’s negotiation with the DPRK.\textsuperscript{14} President Bush expressed “some skepticism about the leader of North Korea” and worried that part of the problem in dealing with North Korea was the lack of transparency.\textsuperscript{15} Congressman Henry Hyde elaborated a hard-line Republican position on the DPRK, arguing that verification is the key to dealing with North Korea since the North’s demonstrated willingness to embrace adequate verification measures is “a signal of a genuine break with the past and a commitment to future cooperation.”\textsuperscript{16} While agreeing to talk with North Korea in a multilateral format, the Bush administration draws a firm and clear line on the North Korean leadership. Hawk engagement—President Bush’s North Korea policy as described by Victor Cha—acknowledges that diplomacy can be helpful, but sees the real value of any engagement in exposing the North’s true intentions and goals.\textsuperscript{17} They are to develop weapons of mass destruction, expel U.S. Forces from South Korea, overthrow the regime in Seoul, and reunify the Korean peninsula under North Korean dominance; hawk engagement aims to thwart these goals by dealing with Pyongyang.
During his visit to Seoul in February 2002, President Bush articulated his opinion that North Korea’s regime and people should be dealt with separately. In 2002, President Bush reaffirmed his view of North Korea as part of the “Axis of Evil,” where the regime allowed the people to starve. He made it clear he did not intend to change his mind until the Kim Jong Il regime demonstrated change. Conversely, President Bush expressed his deep concern and sympathy for the North Korean people, saying he wanted them to have food and freedom.18

President Bush’s differentiation between the North Korean people and their leadership is absent from both President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and President Roh’s Peace and Prosperity Policy. This suggests a significant gap between the attitudes of Seoul and Washington toward the North Korean leadership and people.

North Korean Human Rights

The gap is visible over the issue of human rights in North Korea. The Roh administration is reluctant to press North Korea on human rights, while the United States, both Democrats and Republicans alike, demonstrates a growing interest in the issue. The Roh administration has not consented to the gathering international community consensus criticizing the North Korean regime for its poor record on human rights. For example, Seoul abstained from voting for two years since 2004, and did not participate in the voting in 2003 for resolutions prepared by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) on human rights in the DPRK. President Roh’s position on the North Korean human rights issue was illustrated in a 2003 interview.

Ultimately, in order to secure the most protection for the most number of people in North Korea, the best method is to open up the Kim Jong Il regime [by persuasion]. Rather than confronting or opposing them politically, it is better to have dialogue with the regime to fundamentally solve this problem. . . . As was the case with Iraq, I don’t think the North Korean human rights conditions can be changed from pressure coming from international public opinion. If I mention the North Korean human rights situation, it will not help to improve the human rights conditions in North Korea.19

Contrary to President Roh’s wish, the U.S. Congress unanimously adopted the North Korea Human Rights Act on July 21, 2004. The bill aims to protect basic human rights in North Korea; to facilitate humanitarian resolution of the defector issue; to increase transparency and monitoring of humanitarian aids in North Korea; to promote free flow of information in and out of North Korea; and to help peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula under a democratic government.20

Some members of the South Korean Parliament took action against this bill. More than 20 members of the ruling Uri Party and one member of the Millennium Democratic Party sent a letter of statement to Senator Richard Lugar, chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, asking him to consider the negative effects of the bill. In their statement, the signatories expressed concern that the bill could increase tension on the Korean peninsula; that North Korea will threaten to halt the ongoing inter-Korean talks fearing that the bill is aimed at the ultimate collapse of the North Korean regime; and that the efforts made by South Korea and the international community will come to naught if the North Korean government feels threatened.21

The U.S. reaction to such apparent anti–human rights sentiment in South Korea is troubling. In late July 2004, James A. Leach, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. House of Representatives, wrote to the chairman of the ruling Uri Party, expressing regret at the party’s attempt to adopt a parliamentary resolution to deter the House bill on North Korean Human Rights. 22 On August 19, 2005, the Bush administration took a further step to appoint Jay Lefkowitz as a special envoy on North Korean human rights. When Mr. Lefkowitz expressed concern about possible worker exploitation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex near the Demilitarized Zone—a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges23—the South Korean assistant minister of unification countered him by arguing “a responsible U.S. government official should ask himself whether the unsubstantiated public criticism of the policies of an ally is in line with the spirit of the alliance or will be desirable for strengthening bilateral relations.”24

Perceptions on Nuclear Threat Posed by North Korea

South Korean Government

From the beginning, the Roh administration has held on to some principles regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis:

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated;
North Korea’s nuclear problem should be resolved peacefully; and
South Korea must play an active role in settling the problem.

Regarding North Korea’s nuclear capability, President Roh once said that it was not yet a substantial threat;25 that the North Korean remark about possessing nuclear weapons at the Beijing three-party talks was a negotiating tactic;26 and that the situation became stable once multilateral talks began.27 President Roh also questioned American assertions that North Korea may already possess nuclear weapons by saying that “I don’t think it is well-grounded information. There is no clear evidence they have nuclear weapons.”28 He further stated that the South Korean intelligence community has no assuring evidence to confirm (or deny) North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons.29
This rather relaxed view seems to change from 2004. It appears that the ROK has come to recognize the seriousness of the nuclear crisis. For example, the National Security Strategy (NSS) report published by the Roh administration in March 2004 opens thus:

The Participatory Government was launched in the midst of serious security concerns stemming from the North Korean nuclear issue. This has emerged as an issue of critical importance as it poses a serious threat to security and undermines peace and stability in Northeast Asia.30

The above phrase in the NSS report illustrates how burdensome the North Korean nuclear problem has been for the Roh administration’s policy-making personnel. In the 2004 Defense White Paper, the ROK Ministry of Defense presented an assessment that North Korea might have extracted 10–14 kilograms of plutonium before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections began in May 1992 and manufactured one or two nuclear warheads.31 And it must have developed a sense of urgency that the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry declared, on February 10, 2005, that the country has built nuclear weapons and will take steps to bolster its nuclear arsenal.

Of course, to recognize the importance of the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons is one thing and to put that into the threat calculation properly and make necessary preparations can be quite another. For instance, the Roh administration stripped North Korea from the title “main enemy” in the 2004 Defense White Paper. By endorsing dialogue as the only method to resolve the nuclear crisis and objecting to any behavior that can increase tension, the Roh Administration appears to firmly believe the North Korean regime will eventually give up nuclear weapons if enough rewards are provided as demonstrated in President Roh’s address at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on November 12, 2004 and the speech during his visit to Mongolia on May 9, 2006.32

Furthermore, some opinions tend to see the United States itself as a source of tension on the Korean peninsula. South Korean reaction to the high-altitude interception incident in March 2003 appears to illustrate this point. In February 2003, President-elect Roh Moo Hyun noted that

It is true that an option to North Korea’s nuclear problem is [the] possibility of [a] U.S. military attack against North Korea. However, striking North Korea is a grave problem that can cause a war on the Korean peninsula and I object to even reviewing such a possibility.33

One of the three principles held by the Roh administration to resolve the issue of North Korea’s WMD development was to oppose any action to increase military tension on the Korean peninsula and not to join in such action.34 Since South Korea’s joining with North Korea for taking a hostile action is simply impossible, this principle appears to send a message to the United States, warning it to avoid any provocative action that may cause a war in Korea.
South Korean Public

South Korean society exhibits signs of uncertainty and confusion over the North Korean nuclear crisis. Many questions have been raised, including whether to believe the allegation that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons; whether there is sufficient evidence to prove such allegations; whether North Korea and/or the United States are lying about the North’s nuclear capability; and the North’s true intention. Even after the North Korean declaration in February 2005, there have been no serious debates in the public domain, not to mention consensus about the North’s nuclear threat as an urgent national security issue.

Popular views on the North Korean nuclear crisis are intimately related to different opinions on how to look at and approach North Korea itself. Pro–North Korean liberals, mostly anti-American, tend to play down the significance of the nuclear problem, while conservatives who appreciate the U.S.–ROK alliance are wary of the North Korean regime’s true intention and are concerned about the North dabbling with nuclear weapons.

The wide differences in South Korean public opinion were exposed when the New York Times reported the investigation into Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan—father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons. Dr. Khan told investigators he saw three nuclear devices while visiting Pyongyang in 1999. On the one hand, a strong view emerged that South Korea needs to accept nuclear-armed North Korea as a reality and take appropriate countermeasures. On the other hand, a conspiracy theory surfaced, questioning why such a story was released during Vice President Cheney’s visit to Japan, China, and South Korea. Some were even skeptical of the truthfulness of the report.

The United States

The Bush administration has upheld a firm belief that North Korea’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons is, in itself, threatening international stability and peace as well as regional security. It has aggravated America’s mistrust of North Korea. From a U.S. perspective, North Korea has violated various agreements, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and is still denying the existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. The longer the North continues to gamble on the nuclear option, the stronger will become the U.S. perception that new nuclear problems can come to pass unless the North Korean regime changes fundamentally.

Before the current North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, the U.S. government traditionally estimated that North Korea had produced enough fissile materials for one or two primitive nuclear devices. Although suggestions that North Korea actually possessed multiple nuclear weapons were rare, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld may have alluded to this in September 2002.

The nuclear crisis has proved to be a turning point, causing drastically different and more alarming assessments of North Korea’s nuclear capability. The North’s
continuous high-explosive testing until 2002;\(^\text{37}\) alleged reprocessing of about 8,000 spent fuel rods in 2003;\(^\text{38}\) beginning to proclaim a reinforced “nuclear deterrent force” in 2003;\(^\text{39}\) the furtive military cooperation with Pakistan revealed in 2004; and declaring to have nuclear weapons in 2005 all suggest the DPRK’s nuclear capability is well in advance of the early 1990s evaluation.

Assessments of the number of primitive nuclear warheads possessed by North Korea as of 2004 vary from four to nine. For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London estimated four to eight warheads, while the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington calculated a maximum of eight to nine warheads.\(^\text{40}\) The IISS estimated North Korea had extracted 7–12.5 kilograms of plutonium before the IAEA inspection started in May 1992 and extracted 17.5–27 kilograms of plutonium by reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuels.\(^\text{41}\) Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld remarked that “I believe they have a small number of nuclear weapons” on October 17, 2002—one day after the nuclear crisis emerged in the public domain with the U.S. State Department statement report of the result of James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in early October.\(^\text{42}\)

At least from the summer of 2003, there seems to be a gathering bipartisan consensus in the United States that North Korea actually possesses multiple nuclear weapons. In July, U.S. officials began to say that North Korea might have three or four nuclear devices.\(^\text{43}\) The CIA, in its report of August 2003 to the Senate Intelligence Committee, assessed that “North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.”\(^\text{44}\) Notably, Senator John McCain said that “North Korea has probably never been more dangerous than any time since the end of the Korean War,” and agreeing fully with him, Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry described North Korea as “a country that really has nuclear weapons.”\(^\text{45}\) More recently, U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that the DPRK may have as many as eight nuclear devices.\(^\text{46}\)

North Korea’s HEU program is generally considered inferior to the plutonium program in that there is no evidence that the North constructed large-scale HEU facilities comparable to the Yongbyon nuclear complex. There are indications, however, that Pyongyang may have received high-level technology cooperation from abroad. If North Korea was supplied with mid-level enriched uranium as Iran is suspected to have from Russia, the North could produce weapon-grade HEU in a short period of time with only a few dozen centrifuges.\(^\text{47}\)

American vigilance and caution against the DPRK were heightened after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since September 2001, a major component of the war against terrorism has been prevention of rogue regimes and terrorist groups from developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Awareness of the dangers of WMD proliferation and the importance of curbing it has never been stronger. Just days before leaving Seoul, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, succinctly pointed out that
It is a difference between the United States and South Korea that recently, many South Koreans feel [a] lesser threat from North Korea while Americans perceive [a] bigger North Korean threat after the 9/11 terror. Americans worry about the connection between WMD and terrorism and fear that terrorists might have WMD in their hands. Because of this, I think they came to feel more nuclear threat from North Korea.  

**Ways to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis**

**South Korea**

In his 2003 inauguration address, President Roh expressed his intention to provide large-scale economic assistance to North Korea if it abandons nuclear weapons. About a year later, he articulated his strong desire for peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem:

Despite the hard time last year, we scored considerable accomplishments. The North Korean nuclear crisis that threatened to lead to war was eased by the Six-Party Talks to find a framework for a peaceful settlement. That represents a precious achievement made possible by the public determination to avoid war on the Korean Peninsula under any circumstance and by the single-hearted diplomacy by the Government.

The Roh administration appears to agree in general, but disagree in specifics with the Bush strategy to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. During President Roh’s visit to Washington in May 2003, the two presidents reconfirmed “they will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea.” They also stated “their strong commitment to work for the ‘complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement’—CVID—of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation.” Since then, CVID has settled as a guiding principle of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Contrary to the outward agreement, there are differences between the two sides on specific steps to induce North Korea to give up nuclear ambitions and on alternative approaches in case diplomatic efforts bear no fruit. South Korea emphasizes that a peaceful resolution through dialogue is the only viable option, and President Roh remarked, “South Korea’s position is peace. In principle, we have to put strong emphasis on peace.”

South Korea’s halfhearted participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) clearly illustrates the tactical differences between the two sides. It has also been reported that South Korea directly quoted North Korea’s strong negative response to the wording of “CVID” when requesting the United States change the terminology. According to Song Min Soon, South Korean chief negotiator of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, North Korean negotiator Kim Gye Gwan once remarked that North and South Korea are on the same boat, and Song later
replied that not only the two Koreas but also China are on the same boat. The discrepancy was tersely summarized by the *New York Times*: “While the United States struggles to ascertain whether North Korea is crossing an invisible line concerning its nuclear activities, South Korea struggles to keep the peace on the peninsula.”

The United States

Opposed to the notion of providing incentives to rogue states for scraping programs that should have never arisen in the first place, the U.S. Republican Party had been a vocal critic of the Clinton administration’s North Korea policy, the tone of which was inherited by the Bush administration.

Under the firm conviction not to repeat the bad precedent of bartering for North Korean compliance with carrots, the United States has placed more importance on “principles and norms,” rather than “making a deal.” Moreover, it has called on the North to adhere sincerely to promises made to the international community. Washington also appears unsatisfied with Seoul’s attitudes, that it has taken no concrete actions to make Pyongyang give up nuclear ambitions, while saying that a nuclear-armed North Korea cannot be tolerated. The Bush administration also argues that North Korea should accept a rigid inspection system, probably comparable to the work undertaken in Iraq by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

These positions and views have combined to form a guiding principle to reach an ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The acronym of the principle is CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement). The word “complete” suggests no repetition of past mistakes in the Agreed Framework, which stopped short of achieving either complete transparency of the North’s nuclear history or complete dismantlement of its nuclear capability and infrastructure. John Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, confirmed that both the HEU program and the plutonium program must be eliminated as part of the complete dismantlement. Regarding the HEU program, North Korea has said that it is willing to discuss technical matters if the United States presents “related evidence.” On the other hand, the U.S. position holds that the provision of evidence about the HEU program, which is much easier to hide than the plutonium program, only helps North Korea’s concealment activities. During the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. negotiating team presented for the first time specific evidence regarding the HEU program to North Korea, and it was reported that the North argued with the United States about it.

The wording “verifiable” derives from the Bush administration’s deep-seated mistrust of North Korea and manifests an intention to establish a reliable verification mechanism to effectively monitor the North’s compliance behavior. In the wake of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, President Bush emphasized again the importance of verification. He remarked that North Korea’s abandoning nuclear weapons and programs is a wonderful step forward, “but now we’ve got to verify whether or not that happens.”
“Irreversible” suggests the measures will eradicate all human, material, and technical infrastructures associated with nuclear development programs and, in consequence, make it impossible for such programs to be revived in the North Korean territories. According to John Bolton, irreversible dismantlement attains its goal when North Korea abandons both its so-called “civil” and “peaceful” nuclear programs as well as military programs and permits the removal of all critical components. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, the United States softened on irreversibility and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject to providing North Korea with light-water reactors. But the light-water reactor issue will be a major bone of contention in the future Six-Party Talks. A day after the conclusion of the fourth round of the talks, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement arguing that it will abandon nuclear weapons only after the light-water reactors are provided. This motion appears to be a typical example of the DPRK’s coercive bargaining behavior—dissatisfied with the status quo, Pyongyang engages in limited disruptive tactics that are risky enough to attract attention, precipitate a crisis, and obtain an outcome more to its advantage than the status quo. The Bush administration flatly refused to be embroiled in this tactic. For example, Condoleezza Rice argued that “there is a clarity about the need for North Korea to dismantle, get back into the NPT, get IAEA safeguards, and then discuss a light-water reactor.” President Roh appeared to take an in-between position, telling his cabinet meeting that Seoul will seek to mediate the dispute.

Despite strong objections to the Bush administration’s North Korea policy, the Democratic party laid out an almost identical principle—CIVE, which means “completely, irreversibly, and verifiably end,” North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Democrats also agreed with Republicans that a military option should not be excluded from the table. This reflects the urgency of North Korean nuclear crisis, which forces Democrats and Republicans to choose an identical path to resolve the crisis despite their political and methodological differences.

Anti-American Sentiments

Outward expression of anti-American sentiments in South Korea is a representative change led by the country’s economic development and political democratization. With variations in degree, however, anti-American sentiments of South Koreans—basically complaints about U.S. attitudes toward their country and people and some problems originated from U.S. Forces in Korea—are widespread and deep-rooted. Under the authoritarian rules of the past, such dissatisfaction with the United States was either submerged within the subconscious or could not be freely expressed. Societal changes, led by prosperity and democracy, have made it possible to publicly express such feelings freely and now form a force of public opinion. It is ironic that the United States faces problems largely because of the democratization of South
Korea, which was fully supported by the American governments throughout the alliance history.

America has taken the major place in the modern history of the ROK, supporting the small country in Northeast Asia in every aspect of nation building and development since independence from Japanese colonial rule. During this process, U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) as a physical symbol of American friendship and security commitment to South Korea have been the backbone of deterring North Korean aggression and bringing about the “miracle of the Han River.”

The USFK has also contributed to the problems, however minor in comparison with the positive function it performed. For example, until quite recently, the South Korean judiciary had difficulty exercising jurisdiction over American soldiers who committed crimes against South Koreans. Many South Koreans believe their government has been often forced to accept American interests as a priority in decision-making. For instance, it has been reported that the ROK military was pressured to procure U.S.-made military equipment, even if the terms of contract were less favorable. The accident in which two schoolgirls died triggered an outburst of long-submerged anti-American sentiments. It is natural that the young generation, educated in a freer and more prosperous era, accustomed to western liberal culture and possessing a greater sense of self-respect, is the main force of this new societal trend.

A sense of discrimination is a forceful element that fosters and sustains anti-American sentiments. There is growing dissatisfaction and even resentment against U.S. discriminatory attitudes on the ROK and Japan. Many in South Korea believe that the U.S.–Japan security alliance is more appreciated by the United States than the U.S.–ROK alliance. In many areas, the Seoul–Washington military cooperation has been lagging behind the tightly knit Tokyo–Washington security ties. For example, South Korea has just begun to equip the F-15K as a new-generation fighter jet, while Japan fielded the same aircraft many years ago. Furthermore, Japan has developed its own new generation fighter jet—the F2—in technical cooperation with the United States. In the past, President Clinton issued a formal apology to Japan when an American soldier raped a Japanese girl, while such cases had been rare in Korea until President Bush apologized for the death of the two schoolgirls. Recent realignments of U.S. Forces in Northeast Asia based on the Global Posture Review (GPR) also suggest that American favor is tilting toward Japan, as shown in the recent U.S.–Japan roadmap for force realignment released on May 1, 2006.

A study in 2000 by a group of prominent scholars and governmental officials described the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for Washington–Tokyo relations. That is, Japan should be regarded as the Great Britain of Asia. The theme of this study has been adopted by the Bush administration in its national security strategy. Japan is characterized as a nation expected to forge a leading role in regional and global affairs, as distinct from South Korea, which is a nation with whom to maintain vigilance toward North Korea. The Republican Party Platform in 2004 defined Japan as “a key partner” and South Korea
as “a valued democratic ally.” In his speech accepting the Republican nomination, President Bush named eight countries that joined a coalition for the Iraq War, saying that they deserve the respect of all Americans, one of which was Japan. South Korea’s contribution of the third biggest number of troops after the United States and Great Britain was not given such kudos. William Safire of the New York Times once described South Korea as neutral, while calling Japan an ally in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Many Koreans wonder why Japan, the former enemy of the United States, should be a primary security partner, while South Korea, which lost many lives during the Vietnam War defending American interests, should not be so. There are growing concerns in East Asia that the U.S.–Japan ties might tempt Tokyo to lean heavily toward militarism under Washington’s patronage, especially when Japan’s nationalist conservatives become more vocal.

### Realignment of American Forces in South Korea

In the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis, a realignment of U.S. Forces in Korea is under way at a rapid pace, which makes many South Koreans concerned about national security. The United States cites the disturbing situation in Iraq and the Global Posture Review as the two main rationales justifying a partial reduction, overhauling, and redeployment of U.S. Forces on the peninsula. Contrary to these rationales, however, there is popular speculation that deteriorating bilateral relations between Seoul and Washington are the real impetus speeding a U.S. Force readjustment. One incident introduced by Moon Chungin, the ROK Foreign Ministry’s Special Ambassador for International Security, suggests that the American decision to accelerate force realignment in South Korea was partly affected by the growing anti-American sentiments. According to Moon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shouted “God damn it! Get them out!” when watching NBC TV news footage of an American MP bleeding after being struck by a stone hurled by a South Korean student. It is therefore not groundless to suggest that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces may turn an emotional issue into a matter of policy and strategy.

Putting security matters in perspective, the North Korean nuclear crisis poses a much more serious challenge to the international community than the Iraqi situation. The IAEA Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei defined the North Korean nuclear problem as the number one international security concern. In this regard, while North Korea is boasting about further accumulating nuclear arsenals, the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw some of the U.S. Forces in Korea is somewhat disappointing. Offsetting troop reductions with an $11 billion armament buildup is insufficient to allay the security concerns of the South Korean people.

Of course, there is a quite different explanation for the U.S. Force redeployment: as a measure to remove limits on the U.S. response to the North Korean nuclear crisis.
For example, one anonymous senior Bush administration official claims that many people in Washington feel that U.S. Forces in Korea would actually hamper America’s exercising available options. In fact, the DPRK propaganda has suggested the recent changes in the deployment of U.S. Forces in Korea are a new and increasing threat to its security. North Koreans have condemned the U.S. Force realignment and equipment buildup as a preparation to launch a preemptive strike against them and a means to overwhelm their country through qualitative advantages.

The reduction of troops overseas became a contentious issue in the U.S. presidential election. On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced plans to recall up to 70,000 troops from bases in Europe and Asia over the next decade as part of a global rearrangement of forces intended to make the military more agile. Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry assailed President Bush’s plan and called the realignment a potential threat to national security. Bearing in mind the danger posed by the North Korean nuclear crisis, Kerry further elaborated his objection:

> For example, why are we unilaterally withdrawing 12,000 troops from the Korean Peninsula at the very time we are negotiating with North Korea—a country that really has nuclear weapons? . . . This is clearly the wrong signal to send at the wrong time.

The GPR planners’ desire to implement an initial phase of restructuring armed forces at an earlier time cannot outweigh the possible security repercussions and subsequent weakness in the ROK-U.S. deterrent posture. Such a withdrawal would also send North Korea an inappropriate signal that could incite their desire for unification by force. The GPR planners should consider the views of former Secretary of Defense William Perry after the current nuclear crisis began.

> A few years ago, I thought we were on a resolution of our principal problem with North Korea, which is its nuclear weapons program. . . . Had that trend continued, I think a major realignment of our military forces would have been in order. . . . Now we are in a new nuclear crisis, and I myself would be reluctant to do anything that could be considered to be weakening our deterrence at this time.

**Conclusion: Remedial Measures**

The U.S. Forces in Korea cannot and should not remain a fixture of the Cold War era. The world as a whole and Northeast Asia in particular have gone through a great deal of change since the end of the Cold War. It is appropriate that national security policies are subject to change, reflecting different dynamics in the region. In this respect, the U.S. Force realignment is understandable and inevitable.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the Korean peninsula is yet to escape the quagmire of the Cold War. Technically, North Korea and China on the one side and South Korea and the United States on the other side are still at war. In addition, the
North Korean nuclear crisis is the most dangerous security threat South Korea has faced since the Korean War in 1950. To the North Korean regime, nuclear weapons are a critical military element that can be used as a threat to dominate South Korea in the two countries’ rivalry and a last resort to guarantee the regime’s survival and continuity. South Korea is not well prepared against North Korea’s threat or use of nuclear weapons. Until now, the “nuclear” element has been missing in the ROK military strategy. The option of developing nuclear weapons on its own has been discarded in South Korea’s national strategy. Furthermore, there is no “nuclear protection” program—the defensive efforts against a nuclear attack such as force realignment planning, force protection programs, and civil defense and education programs. Meanwhile, the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, an effective deterrent force for many years, were withdrawn in the early 1990s.

In such a dire security situation, any change in the deterrent postures against the DPRK should be considered with maximum caution and sensitivity. The U.S.–ROK alliance should not be damaged by emotional distractions either. Seoul and Washington should not forget that it has been Pyongyang’s deliberate and strategic goal to drive a wedge between the two sides. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that the ROK and the U.S. administrations should avoid behavior that gives the misleading impression of serious differences between them.

If there is a change in the ROK or U.S. administration, the current bilateral relationship is likely to shift to a less contentious mode than now. A new administration in either side will have fresh energy and a better chance to look at the relationship in a comprehensive and less emotional way. But it cannot be expected that all problems will disappear with the emergence of new administrations. Moreover, the anti-American sentiments in South Korea will still remain for a considerable period of time, mainly because the sentiments—historically deep-rooted and widespread—became a forceful element of the public opinion. Much needed are remedial measures for forging a better ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship with a long-term vision and vigor.

Overcome Identity Crisis

The most immediate task is to recover a common identity of the two sides with respect to North Korea. To simplify North Korea as an entity with one single character, either a tyranny or a cooperation partner, would only add to bilateral discords. Likewise, to perceive North Korea as an entity with dual nature like two-sides of a coin—namely, an enemy and a friend at the same time—as observed by many South Korean experts would not contribute to resolving current problems involving the North, but only augment confusion.

It would be more appropriate to have an analytical perspective to view North Korea consisting of two diametrically different entities. One is a group of elites who have strong vested interests in keeping a dictatorial regime in North Korea, some of whom are even determined to have the same destiny with Kim Jong Il and his cronies. The other are the
ordinary people, a vast majority in numbers, who are suffering poverty and abuses, incomparable to neighboring South Korean or even Chinese living standards. The ROK and the United States are recommended to jointly focus their policies toward North Korea on the latter, namely, to make a primary policy objective of improving ordinary North Korean citizens’ basic political and humanitarian needs. By setting the same policy objective, they would be able to overcome the difficulties caused by an identity crisis, and in the end, to recover the same identity with regards to the North.

Devise a New Defense Strategy against Nuclear-Armed North Korea

South Korea and the United States are urged to share a common assessment of North Korea’s nuclear capability and threat and work together to make proper countermeasures. In fact, the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance will be largely influenced by how closely the two countries cooperate on a common goal and harmonize their approaches to resolve the nuclear crisis.

To Seoul and Washington, a nuclear-armed Pyongyang means that they are facing a new security challenge, drastically different from what they were accustomed to deal with. The new security environment forged by North Korea’s nuclear weapons requires the bilateral alliance to have a new defense concept and strategy beyond the traditional deterrence strategy maintained throughout the Cold War era. One possibility might be “tailored deterrence” proclaimed by the United States in 2006. Moving away from a “one size fits all” notion of deterrence, tailored deterrence aims at providing a fully balanced, tailored capability to deter various threats including WMD employment, terrorist attacks, and opportunistic aggression. A nuclear-armed North Korea dictates that the USFK and the ROK-U.S. alliance must adopt tailored deterrence as a new defense strategy and build their military forces flexible enough to meet asymmetrical threats posed by the North’s WMD, long-range delivery means, and special forces.

Minimize Potential Damages Arising from Japan Factors

It is also very important for the United States not to produce a sense of discrimination in South Korea vis-à-vis Japan. South Koreans still harbor much suspicion toward Japan largely because they think the Japanese are not sincere enough to recognize and take responsibility for their wrongdoings during the colonial period. As a New York Times editorial succinctly points out, public discourse in Japan and modern history lessons in its schools have never properly come to terms with the country’s responsibility for such terrible events as mass kidnappings, sexual enslavement, and biological warfare experiments.

The current ROK–Japan relationship is embroiled with such issues as the territorial dispute over an islet called Dokdo in the East Sea, Japan’s manipulation of history by glossing over its wartime atrocities, improper treatment of Korean “comfort
women”—sexual slaves—and most of all, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni war shrine. The shrine is seen in Asia as a symbol of Japan’s militarism because the names of fourteen Class A war criminals from the Second World War are also memorialized. In his five years in office, Mr. Koizumi has visited the shrine five times. South Koreans think that Japan’s understanding of the enormities of the past is essential to a saner future, and such understanding is impossible without wholeheartedly accepting true historical facts as they are. In this respect, Japan cannot stand the comparison with Germany.

Japan’s mismanagement of past wrongdoings can do damage to the ROK-U.S. bilateral alliance depending on U.S. attitudes. To minimize potential damages to the alliance, the United States must come forward and tell the Japanese what is wrong and what needs be corrected. For instance, Michael Green, a former senior official in charge of East Asian affairs at the White House, said that Mr. Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni was his personal decision that he will not change even under pressure from the United States. He even argued that it is counterproductive for the U.S. government to push Koizumi to change his stance on Yasukuni.85 It is argued that such an evasive attitude lacks necessary courage and will to root out a bone of contention between America’s two important allies. Furthermore, it will send an unintended wrong signal to the Japanese that the Unites States can ignore Japan’s unforgiven past wrongdoings so as to have better U.S.–Japan ties for the future.

Based on correct understanding of Asian history, the United States should be more honest, courageous, and straightforward. The action taken by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, has telling implications for the U.S. administration and opinion leaders in America. Mr. Hyde raised concerns about Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine in a letter to House Speaker Dennis Hastert in late April 2006. He called for assurances from Mr. Koizumi that he would not visit Yasukuni soon after making a speech to a joint session of Congress during his visit to the United States in June. He further warned that “a visit to Yasukuni would be an affront to older Americans who remember World War Two and would dishonor the site in Congress where President Franklin D. Roosevelt made his ‘day of infamy’ speech after the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.”86

In short, the United States must treat South Korea on par with Japan at least in the security domain. For stability in Northeast Asia, it is not desirable to foster South Korean perceptions that Washington is more sided with Tokyo and one day could sacrifice its alliance relationship with Seoul so as to protect Tokyo. As the United States is tilting toward Japan, a growing number of South Koreans will become sympathetic toward China in the Sino–U.S. relationship.

Cultivate Mutual Understanding

Since anti-American sentiments in South Korean society have not suddenly appeared, the ROK and the United States governments and the USFK are required
to put more efforts on working together to remedy existing problems and to prevent potential ones. Systematic efforts need to be undertaken, both on official and unofficial levels, to increase mutual understanding of the two nations.

It is recommended that the United States appreciate developments and positive changes in South Korea, which were largely owed to American contributions and sacrifice. At the same time, Washington needs to broaden audiences in South Korea by coming forward to grass roots and courageously engaging with those who have critical views on America. Relying only on pro-America establishments in the South that have intimate relations with the United States, Washington cannot fully grasp broad public opinions of South Koreans. On the part of South Korea, it is important for the ROK government to remove any misleading feelings that the bilateral alliance served unilaterally for the interests of the United States and that will be no longer valid in the twenty-first century. To educate the young generation about historical facts and to induce their sound and objective judgments will be crucial in this regard.

**Link U.S. Force Reduction with North Korean Threat Reduction**

Regarding the U.S. Forces in South Korea, rather than a unilateral and hasty readjustment, U.S. Force change should be part of the overall arms control and peace-building process on the Korean peninsula. For instance, two high-ranking officials during the senior Bush administration proposed linking North Korea’s nuclear capability and the U.S. military posture on the peninsula.87

In this regard, it is auspicious that an outcome of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks is to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula at an appropriate forum and to explore ways and means to promote security cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is also noted that the Bush administration is considering a broad new approach to deal with North Korea that would include starting negotiations over a formal peace treaty.88 Under the circumstances, it is strongly recommended that any further reduction of the U.S. Forces in South Korea become a part of this broader and regional initiative and be linked with a corresponding threat reduction by North Korea.

**Develop Common Strategic Vision**

Finally, for the future of the alliance, it will be very important for the two sides to share a common vision of the twenty-first century. To develop a future-oriented but reality-based vision at least for the first half of this century may be the most efficient and effective remedial measure to the current problems of the alliance—identity crisis and deficiency in mutual understanding. This vision will be beyond a narrow issue area, encompassing economy, security, regional order, environment, culture, and human dignity.

It is noted that two dialogues with long-term perspectives are currently underway between the two governments—the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) between the two
militaries since 2005 and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiation launched in June 2006. The military dialogue at the moment largely focuses on tactical issues such as movement of USFK bases and joint command relationship study. This dialogue is recommended to have broader and longer-term perspectives and work on developing a common strategic vision between the two militaries. At the same time, civilian security experts in the two countries should be encouraged to get together and put forward their own ideas for forging joint strategic vision. In this respect, the U.S.-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation after the Cold War can be a role model. A 26-member Study Group (thirteen experts from each country) took part in a two-year study on personnel capacity and worked together to deepen mutual understanding on sensitive arms control issues, to head off potential conflict and to identify opportunities for constructive partnership in promoting progress toward a nuclear-free world. For the Free Trade Agreement, both sides have shown strong interests to the success of the negotiation. As Alexander Vershbow, U.S. ambassador to Seoul, mentioned, the bilateral FTA must be a path toward strengthening the bilateral relations and reassuring regional peace in the long term. Indeed, failure of the FTA talks would not be an option for the better future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

In summary, the first decade of the twenty-first century will be a period of birth pains that will shape a new bilateral relationship between the ROK and the United States. This will be a great challenge for the governments and people of the two nations, which will also have profound impacts on the regional and global orders. They must consider carefully how to improve the bilateral alliance, while reminding themselves of the proverb that “After a storm comes a calm.”

Notes

9. In recent years, South Korea has taken motions that appear to tilt toward China instead of the United States. This can be viewed as identity differences that have affected interstate relations and normative structures—the second category.
11. In an interview with TBS in Japan on February 9, 2000, President Kim remarked “I have heard that he is a man of good judgment and knowledge as a leader.” http://www.cwd.go.kr.
25. At a meeting held by the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry, president-elect Roh Moo Hyun described North Korea’s nuclear threat as not existing in substance. Dong-a Ilbo, February 20, 2003.
27. At the joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Roh remarked that compared to six months ago, the crisis situation was subdued and stability was very much enhanced. Office of the President, Republic of Korea, July 20, 2003, http://www.president.go.kr.
33. President-elect Roh made this remark at a meeting held by the Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry. Dong-a Ilbo, February 20, 2003.
34. The other two principles are: (1) Peaceful resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile problems and massive economic aid to the North according to each step of the resolution; and (2) Pursuing comprehensive security through inter-Korean economic cooperation in light of the negative economic effects of the security risk posed by North Korea’s possession of WMD. Peace and Prosperity Policy of the Participatory Government (Seoul: The Ministry of Unification, 2003), 8.
36. He remarked that “We know they are a country that has been aggressively developing nuclear weapons and has nuclear weapons.” DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Pace, The Department of Defense, September 16, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil.
37. The chief of South Korea’s National Intelligence Services confirmed at the Intelligence Committee of the ROK National Assembly that North Korea carried out high-explosive tests about seventy times from 1997 to September 2002. *Dong-a Ilbo*, July 10, 2003. Previously, North Korea had performed a similar number of high-explosive tests from the 1980s, but stopped after the Agreed Framework was signed.


39. A commentary of the Korean Central News Agency argued “if the U.S. keeps threatening the DPRK with nuclear weapons instead of abandoning its hostile policy toward Pyongyang, the DPRK will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force [emphasis added].” *Korean Central News Agency*, June 9, 2003. Before this commentary, on June 6, spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said that “As far as the issue of a nuclear deterrent force is concerned, the DPRK has the same legal status as the United States and other states possessing nuclear deterrent forces which are not bound to any international law.” *Rodong Sinmun*, June 7, 2003.


49. President Roh stated that “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things that it wants. It is up to Pyongyang whether to go ahead and obtain nuclear weapons or to get guarantees for the security of its regime and international economic support.” Full text of Roh’s inaugural speech: *A New Takeoff Toward an Age of Peace and Prosperity*, February 25, 2003, http://www.president.go.kr.


53. *Press Conference for the 100th Day of the New Administration*.


55. *Chosun Ilbo*, September 21, 2005.


58. During a U.S. delegation’s visit to North Korea in January 2004, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan said that North Korea had no facilities, equipment, or scientists dedicated to a HEU program and added that “We can be very serious when we talk about this. We are fully open to technical talks.” Siegfried Hecker, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea, January 21, 2004, 10. On March 10, 2004, the spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry reconfirmed its willingness to hold technical talks if relevant information is provided by the United States. Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2004.


67. For example, Senator John Kerry, the Democratic presidential candidate, mentioned that “I’d make it very clear I’m prepared to do whatever’s necessary [for North Korea] to not have nuclear weapons, and I am prepared.” He also said that “this is very important: North Korea should never doubt the resolve of the United States to be serious about proliferation.” “In His Words: John Kerry,” New York Times, March 6, 2004.


69. The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 11, 2000. Among the group, Richard Armitage, Kurt Campbell, Michael Green, James Kelly, Robert Manning, Joseph Nye, and Paul Wolfowitz were members.


82. Other North Korean motivations for having nuclear weapons might be to deter the United States from attacking or imposing a regime change on the country, and to use as a bargaining leverage to induce withdrawal of the U.S. Forces from South Korea, or rein in U.S. military operations in Northeast Asia.
87. Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, “A Surprising Success on North Korea,” *New York Times*, May 1, 2003. They argued that “we can press the case that if the North Koreans are serious about putting those [nuclear and missile] programs on hold, we would reciprocate with respect to our military forces in and around the Korean peninsula.”

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